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TITLE III AT A CROSSROADS: THE ORDINARY COURSE OF
BUSINESS IN THE HOME, THE CONSENT OF CHILDREN,
AND PARENTAL WIRETAPPING
DAVID J. ANDERMANt
"Of what value are the thoughts, reveries and treasured hoardings of
scraps ofpaper that children find so dear? Only that they may be imparted
later to some one worthy of complete confidence. Why not to parents? Only
because parents have sometimes forfeited the right by their disregard of
privacy."'
"Teach your children: secret recording, like eavesdropping, is shameful
and wrong. Snooping by government and credit bureaus is bad enough;
we don't want to become a nation of spies. "2
INTRODUCTION
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
19683 was enacted to assure the privacy of all oral and wire
communications, and to define the circumstances under which
interceptions of such conversations may be authorized. 4  Its
sweeping prohibitions apply to "any person" who intercepts the
t B.A. 1991, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. Candidate 1994, University of
Pennsylvania. This Comment was written in conjunction with Professor Seth
Kreimer's Privacy and Disclosure seminar. I owe thanks to the Honorable Armand
Arabian, AssociateJustice of the Supreme Court of California, and to Leonard Swyer
for introducing me to this area of the law and for the opportunity to begin to address
it. I am indebted as well to my fellow University of Pennsylvania Law Review members
(especially Tony, Val, and Sal) for their editorial assistance. Finally, I appreciate the
loving help and support of my parents, Sigmund and Susan, my family, and all of my
friends.
I dedicate this Comment to my father, not because he is a parental wiretapper,
but because he continually inspires me to succeed in the law and in life.
1 MIRIAM VAN WATERS, PARENTS ON PROBATION 56 (1927).
2 William Safire, Telephone Traps, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1992, at A17.
3 Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 197, 211-25, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N.
237, 253 (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1988 & Supp. III 1991))
[hereinafter Title III].
4 See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1968), reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2153.
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conversations of others without permission, subjecting most
instances of private wiretapping to civil and criminal penalties
unless specifically excepted. Though Title III contains no general
exceptions for domestic wiretapping, many courts have been
unwilling to apply Title III's broad prohibitions to the home. The
courts' unease with applying Title III to domestic wiretapping stems,
in part, from the fact that private wiretapping often involves
wiretapping between family members.5 The most common cases
involve a husband or wife tapping the telephone of a spouse (often
recording all incoming and outgoing calls) in order to discover
infidelities. 6 Many cases, however, involve parents intercepting the
telephone conversations of their minor children.7 The magnitude
5 "In the private sector, the most prevalent form of illegal eavesdropping occurs
in the context of marital or family relations. This includes surveillance by one spouse
on another, or between lovers, as well as surveillance of children by their parents."
NATIONAL COMM'N FOR THE REVIEW OF FED. & STATE LAWS RELATING TO WIRETAP-
PING AND ELEC. SURVEILLANCE, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 161 (1976) [hereinafter
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE] (the Commission was mandated by § 804 of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968).
6 See id. at 22. Although the Commission found that estimates were difficult
because many incidents go unreported, "the major category of illegal eavesdropping
appears by far to be marital spying, followed by parental, industrial, political, and
illegal police spying." Id. The prevalence of domestic wiretapping has caused an
"avalanche of cases arising out of marital disputes." CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN,
WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING § 25.1, at 211 (Supp. 1992). Many of these cases
involve rather bizarre situations. The facts of People v. Otto, 831 P.2d 1178 (Cal.),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 414 (1992), are among the more intriguing-and disturbing-of
the interspousal wiretapping cases:
Joe Otto's distrust of his younger wife, Brenda Sue, bordered on the
obsessive .... To confirm his suspicions [of infidelity],Joe secretly tape-
recorded Brenda's telephone calls from the family residence. These
recordings captured a conversation between Brenda and her suspected
paramour which added a new and horrifying dimension toJoe's fears; the
illicit alliance was a reality, but its object was not merely his wealth and
marriage, it was his life itself.
Joe's concerns proved to be well founded. Within 48 hours of the
recorded conversation, he was found dead-bludgeoned to death in his own
home.
Id. at 1179. Joe's creation of the incriminating tape recording was held to be a
violation of Title III, the evidence was thrown out, and Brenda Sue's conviction for
murder was reversed. See id. at 1195.
7 The issue has been presented to courts in numerous Title III cases, although few
have addressed the issue directly. See, e.g., Thompson v. Dulaney, 970 F.2d 744, 746
(10th Cir. 1992) (parent recording conversations between child and estranged
spouse); Newcomb v. Ingle, 944 F.2d 1534, 1535 (10th Cir. 1991) (wife recording ex-
husband's telephone conversation in which he instructed their two children to set fire
to wife's home), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 903 (1992); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558
F.2d 677, 678 (2d Cir. 1977) (parent recording conversations between child and
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of the problem is not insignificant. A survey of over 160,000
teenagers revealed that thirty-three percent of them thought their
parents rarely respected their privacy, one of their major concerns
being eavesdropping on telephone conversations. 8 In one extreme
case, a family in Texas recorded the telephone conversations of
their drug-abusing daughter almost continuously for six years,
including a four year period of twenty-four hour surveillance.
9
Though such recordings are almost certainly violations of Title
III,10 courts deciding both interspousal and parental wiretapping
cases often refuse to apply Title III's clear prohibitions to "mere
domestic conflicts,"11 citing a lack of congressional intent to
extend Title III to the home. 12 Other courts refuse to create an
exception to Title III for domestic wiretapping where Congress has
mandated none. This division has been the focus of a nineteen year
debate among federal and state judiciaries over the scope of Titie
III's protection.
The dispute began in 1974 when the Fifth Circuit decided
Simpson v. Simpson,"3 the first in a series of cases that held that
Congress did not intend Title III to apply to interspousal wiretap-
ping,14 thus spawning the so-called "interspousal exception." In
Simpson, a suspicious husband placed a recording device on a
household telephone to intercept the "mildly compromising"
conversations between his wife and another man. 15 Following
estranged spouse); Scheib v. Grant, 814 F. Supp. 736, 737 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (father
recording conversations between ex-wife and son); PIatt v. Platt, 685 F. Supp. 208,208
(E.D. Mo. 1988) (same), rev'd, 951 F.2d 159 (8th Cir. 1989);Janecka v. Franklin, 684
F. Supp. 24, 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (same), ajfd per curiam, 843 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1988);
State v. Shaw, 404 S.E.2d 887, 888 (N.C. Ct. App.) (mother recording son's drug
deal), appeal denied, 407 S.E.2d 548 (1991).
8 See JANE NORMAN & MYRON W. HARRIS, THE PRIvATE LIFE OF THE AMERICAN
TEENAGER 33-35 (1981).
9 See ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, supra note 5, at 161.
10 See id.
11 Anonymous, 558 F.2d at 679; see also Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 809 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974); Newcomb, 944 F.2d at 1536; Lizza v. Lizza, 631
F. Supp. 529, 533 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); London v. London, 420 F. Supp. 944, 946-47
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); Baumrind v. Ewing, 279 S.E.2d 359, 359 (S.C.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1092 (1981).
12 Courts find this lack of intent both by reviewing the legislative history of Title
III, see infra part I, and by extrapolating an intent to "abjure from deciding a very
intimate question offamilial relations" from the existence of an exception for the use
of extension telephones in the home. Simpson, 490 F.2d at 809.
Is Id.
14 See id.
15 Id. at 804.
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their divorce, the wife brought an action under Title 111.16 Al-
though the Simpson court observed at the outset that "[t]he naked
language of Title III, by virtue of its inclusiveness, reache[d] this
case," 17 a "long, exhaustive, and inconclusive" search of legislative
materials18 led the court to conclude that "Congress did not
intend such a farreaching result, one extending into areas normally
left to states, those of the marital home and domestic conflicts."
19
While a number of courts have followed Simpson, the vast majority
of courts20 and commentators21 have severely criticized Simpson's
16 See id.
17 Id. at 805.
18 Id. at 806.
19 Id. at 805.
20 See, e.g., Thompson v. Dulaney, 970 F.2d 744, 748 (10th Cir. 1992); Heggy v.
Heggy, 944 F.2d 1537, 1541-42 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1514 (1992);
Kempfv. Kempf, 868 F.2d 970, 972 (8th Cir. 1989); Platt v. Platt, 951 F.2d 159, 160
(8th Cir. 1989); Pritchard v. Pritchard, 732 F.2d 372, 374 (4th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661, 669 (6th Cir. 1976); White v. Weiss, 535 F.2d 1067,
1069-70 (8th Cir. 1976); Walker v. Carter, 820 F. Supp. 1095, 1097 (C.D. I11. 1993);
Nations v. Nations, 670 F. Supp. 1432, 1436 (W.D. Ark. 1987); Flynn v. Flynn, 560 F.
Supp. 922, 924-25 (N.D. Ohio 1983); Heyman v. Heyman, 548 F. Supp. 1041, 1045
(N.D. Ill. 1982); Gill v. Wilier, 482 F. Supp. 776, 778 (W.D.N.Y. 1980); Kratz v. Kratz,
477 F. Supp. 463, 467-76 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Ex parte O'Daniel, 515 So. 2d 1250, 1251
(Ala. 1987); People v. Otto, 831 P.2d 1178, 1184-85 (Cal.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 414
(1992); State v. Jock, 404 A.2d 518, 521-22 (Del. Super. Ct. 1979); Markham v.
Markham, 272 So. 2d 813, 814 (Fla. 1973); Ransom v. Ransom, 324 S.E.2d 437, 438-
39 (Ga. 1985); Standiford v. Standiford, 598 A.2d 495,500 (Md. App. 1991); Stamme
v. Stamme 589 S.W.2d 50, 52 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); M.G. v.J.C., 603 A.2d 990, 993
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1991); Rickenbaker v. Rickenbaker, 290 S.E.2d 347, 352
(N.C. 1976); State v. Shaw, 404 S.E.2d 887, 889 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991); Pulawski v.
Blais, 506 A.2d 76, 77 (R.I. 1986); Turner v. P.V. Int'l Corp., 765 S.W.2d 455, 469
(Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
21 See e.g.,JAMEs G. CARR, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE § 3.6, at 3-107
(1992) (stating that courts which are reluctant to hold that interspousal and
intrafamilial surveillance is unlawful "disregard the straightforward legislative
framework and unambiguous statutory language [of Title III]"); FISHMAN, supra note
6, § 25.1(c), at 212 (noting that Simpson was wrongly decided and that the "trend is
against the Simpson "marital home" exception); WilliamJ. Holt, Comment, Interspousal
Electronic Surveillance Immunity, 7 U. TOL. L. REV. 185, 203 (1975) ("[T]here was no
doubt [in Congress] about the propriety of electronic surveillance in the private
sector. Congress intended that such activities should be prohibited entirely.");
Asenath Kepler, Comment, Title III and the Classic Triangle: Should the Immunity
Doctrine Apply to Interspousal Electronic Surveillance?, 12 CREIGHToN L. REV. 1209,1228
(1979);Jonathan D. Niemeyer, Comment, All in the Family: Interspousal and Parental
Wiretapping Under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Act, 81 KY. L.J. 237, 255 (1992)
("[Title III's] unequivocal 'blanket prohibition' of private wiretapping must be
honored."); Dorian L. Rowe, Comment, Wiretapping and the Modern Marriage: Does
Title III Provide a Federal Remedy for Victims of Interspousal Electronic Surveillance?, 91
DICK. L. REV. 855, 872 (1987) (exploring the respective roles Title III and the
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interpretation of the language and legislative history of Title III and
its creation of the interspousal exception.22 These courts hold that
the clear and unambiguous language of Title III prohibits all
wiretaps except those specifically enumerated. Interspousal
wiretapping is not so enumerated.
23
Although the recent trend among courts is firmly in favor of
applying Title III's prohibitions to interspousal wiretapping, courts
have been less eager to apply Title III to a second brand of domestic
wiretapping-that by parents of their children's telephone conversa-
tions. For example, while one panel in the Tenth Circuit found
itself "compelled first and foremost by the clear and unambiguous
language of [Title III]" to reject the interspousal exception and the
reasoning of Simpson in an interspousal wiretapping case,
24
another panel, in a decision handed down only a month earlier,
refused to apply Title III to parental wiretapping, arguing that
interspousal wiretapping is "qualitatively different from a custodial
parent tapping a minor child's conversations within the family home."
25
doctrine of interspousal immunity play in cases of interspousal electronic surveil-
lance); Stephen L. Sapp, Note, Private Interceptions of Wire and Oral Communications
Under Title III: Rethinking Congressional Intent, 16 AM. J. CRIM. L. 181, 183 (1989)
(analyzing the problem of private interceptions which are subjected to warrantless
replaying by the authorities and subsequently used as evidence to prosecute crimes
other than wiretapping); Note, Interspousal Electronic Surveillance and Title 111, 12 VAL.
U. L. REv. 537, 542-46 (1978) (criticizing Simpson); Roslyn A. Lipton, Case Note, 27
BuFF. L. REv. 139, 155 (1978) (arguing that "[a]n exemption for marital disputes is
suggested neither by the wording nor the legislative history of Title III"); Recent
Decision, Criminal Law-Electronic Surveillance-Neither the Plain Language nor the
Legislative History of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968
Justifies an Implied Exceptionfor Interspousal Wiretapes [sic]-United States v.Jones, 542
F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976), 11 GA. L. REv. 427, 436 (1977).
Only one commentator has suggested that Title III should not be applied to
interspousal surveillance, arguing instead that, as the issue involves domestic relations
doctrine, there is a "strong presumption" that state law should govern. See Cori D.
Stephens, Note, Ali's Fair: No Remedy Under Title Ilfor Interspousal Surveillance, 57
FORDHAM L. REv. 1035, 1052 (1989).
22 The most vitriolic attack on Simpson is presented in Kratz v. Kratz, 477 F. Supp.
463, 467-76 (E.D. Pa. 1979) which criticizes at length Simpson's "Humpty-Dumpty
method ofjurisprudence." Id. at 470 (citation omitted). See infra notes 171-80 and
accompanying text.
23 See e.g., United States v.Jones, 542 F.2d 661, 673 (6th Cir. 1976) ("[T]he plain
language of the section and the Act's legislative history compels interpretation of the
statute to include interspousal wiretaps").
24 Heggy v. Heggy, 944 F.2d 1537, 1539 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1514 (1992).
2' Newcomb v. Ingle, 944 F.2d 1534, 1535-36 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Simpson for
support). Apparently, only one decision has held Title III applicable to parental
wiretapping. See State v. Shaw, 404 S.E.2d 887 (N.C. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 407
22651993]
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What is the reason for this disparity? Title III proscribes the
interception of telephone conversations by "any person" who does
not fall under exceptions specifically provided for in the Act.
26
There is no explicit exception for parental wiretapping.27 As one
court has pointed out, "Title III is not ... an intrusion by the
federal government into the law of domestic relations .... Title III
regulates electronic eavesdropping, not marital relations."28 Those
who oppose applying Title III to parental wiretapping usually focus
on a perceived intrusion by government into an area normally left
private and open to parental discretion, namely, childrearing. In
order to determine whether such an intrusion is justified, the law
often mandates an inquiry into whether the "best interests" of a
child will be served by governmental involvement.29 Under this
standard, the argument for exempting parental wiretapping from
the prohibitions of Title III is persuasive only if one assumes that
parents act in the best interests of their children when they
eavesdrop on their conversations. An analogous argument was
raised in support of the interspousal exception and subsequently
rejected. s0 In fact, one could argue that allowing parental wiretap-
S.E.2d 548 (1991).
26 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1).
27 See id. § 2511(2)(a)-(h) (enumerating the exceptions to Title III). Some courts
have argued, however, that § 2510(5)(a)(i), which excludes from the definition of
"'electronic, mechanical, or other device[s]'" covered by Title III "any telephone...
used.., in the ordinary course of ... business," implies that Congress did not intend
Title III to apply to telephones used to record conversations in the home. See, e.g.,
Simpson, 490 F.2d at 809. This so called "extension phone exception" is discussed
below. See infra part I.A.
28 Kratz v. Kratz, 477 F. Supp. 463, 475-76 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
2' See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
30 It has been argued in interspousal wiretapping cases that the common law
"unity of interest" doctrine exempts husbands and wives from liability under Title III
because each spouse is assumed to be acting in the best interests of both. See Kepler,
supra note 21, at 1212. The interspousal immunity doctrine to Title III,just as the
interspousal exception itself, has been all but rejected in the past 10 years in the face
of universal criticism. See, for example, M.G. v.J.C., 603 A.2d 990 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1991), where the court stated:
There is no reason whatsoever to allow spouses to perform non-consensual
tortious acts against each other than there is to allow them to perform them
against third parties. The right of privacy extends within the confines of the
marital home. It is not somehow dissipated into the air upon the taking of
marriage vows. Moreover since the instant case... aris[es] from a taping
designed to "prove" marital infidelity, can it be seriously argued that a viable
marital home or relationship exists. Rather, as is the norm in cases dealing
with estranged spouses living under the same roof, the need for privacy is
probably greater than under normal living conditions. A secretive taping
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ping is more harmful than regulating it. Indeed, in many situations
governmental intrusion into the family may not merely be justified
but required.31
Moreover, it is not only the privacy of the person whose
conversations are intercepted which is violated, but that of the
person on the other end of the line as well.3 2 As Justice Brandeis
pointed out over sixty-five years ago:
Whenever a telephone line is tapped, the privacy of the persons at
both ends of the line is invaded and all conversations between
them upon any subject, and although proper, confidential and
privileged, may be overheard. Moreover, the tapping of one man's
telephone line involves the tapping of the telephone of every other
person whom he may call or who may call him. As a means of
espionage, writs of assistance and general warrants are but puny
instruments of tyranny and oppression when compared with wire-
tappingY
33
This Comment argues that Title III's broad prohibitions on
wiretapping should be applied to all instances of domestic wiretap-
ping. Inasmuch as parental and interspousal wiretapping are
related analytically and combined jurisprudentially, the first half of
this Comment will summarize the origins and criticisms of the
interspousal exception and suggest that an exception allowing
parental and other domestic wiretapping is equally flawed. Part I
analyzes the language and legislative history of Title III, focusing on
the "extension phone exception" and the issue of one-party consent.
Part II addresses the treatment of Title III by the judiciary, from the
of a spouse's calls under these conditions is an invasion in a most egregious
fashion.
Id. at 994-95; see also Burgess v. Burgess, 447 So. 2d 220, 222 (Fla. 1984) ("The
arguments generally furthered in support of interspousal tort immunity are not
applicable where illegal electronic surveillance is an issue.").
31 See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
s2 See United States v.Jones, 542 F.2d 661,670 (6th Cir. 1976); see also Holt, supra
note 21, at 208-09 ("It cannot be overemphasized that the evil of electronic
surveillance stems from its capability to invade the privacy ofinnocent people, as well
as the privacy of the targeted spouse.").
33 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 475-76 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting); see also 114 CONG. REC. 14,713 (1968) (statement of Sen. Brewster)
(echoingJustice Brandeis's concerns in the debate on Title III). Justice Brandeis's
opinion that wiretapping is a violation of the principles underlying the Fourth
Amendment was later adopted by the Court in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 63-
64 (1967) and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967). See United States v.
Jones, 542 F.2d 661, 670 (6th Cir. 1976) (pointing out that Title III was drafted in
compliance with Beiger and Katz).
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relatively settled decisions on interspousal wiretapping to the
incomplete and evolving jurisprudence of parental wiretapping.
This Part will summarize the origins and criticisms of the inter-
spousal exception in order to suggest how an exception for allowing
parental and other domestic wiretapping is equally flawed. Finally,
Part III addresses the theoretical justifications and strategies for
applying (or not applying) Title III to children.
I. TITLE III: THE WORDS AND THEIR PLAIN MEANING
Possibly the simplest aspect of the problem of parental wiretap-
ping is presented by the language of Title III. Title III provides
that:
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any
person who-
(a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or
procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to
intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication;
shall be [criminally] punished.., or shall be subject to [civil] suit
as provided in [this section].
3 4
Title III allows such civil suits to be filed by "any person whose wire,
oral, or electronic communication is intercepted, disclosed, or
intentionally used." 5  This language led the Supreme Court to
declare that "[t]he purpose of the legislation.., was effectively to
prohibit, on the pain of criminal and civil penalties, all interceptions
of oral and wire communications, except those specifically provided
for in the Act."
8 6
Although "[t]he major purpose of Title III is to combat
organized crime," 7 the legislative history of Title III abounds with
expressions which show that Congress intended to prohibit all
m 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a). Of the exceptions delineated in § 2511(2)(a)-(h), only
subsection (d), which excepts interceptions which are authorized by one of the parties
to the conversation, is arguably applicable to parental wiretapping. Some parents
have argued that their children have impliedly authorized the interception of their
conversations, or that parents, as guardians, can consent for children. This argument
has not been fleshed out in the jurisprudence. See infra part III.
Title III also has an exclusionary rule: § 2515 prohibits the use of the contents
of intercepted communications "in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or
before any" federal, state, or other governmental body.
35 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a).
36 United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 514 (1973) (citation omitted).
37 S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 4, at 70, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2157.
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incidences of private wiretapping. 8  For example, Senator
McClellan, a sponsor of one of the bills combined to create Title
III 9 stated:
I understand there are those-and I do not quarrel with them-
who just simply abhor the thought of anybody tapping the
telephone or any such invasion of privacy.
*.. [A]s a matter of fact, there is no question... that a lot of
wiretapping goes on where privacy is invaded and the law is
completely inadequate to protect the individuals [sic] against that
intrusion upon his life.40
Congress was also aware that private wiretapping often involved
domestic relations. Professor G. Robert Blakey, widely perceived as
the author of Title III,41 has stated that it was "aimed at corrupt
38 Senate Report 1097 states that:
Title III has as its dual purpose (1) protecting the privacy of wire and
oral communications, and (2) delineating on a uniform basis the circum-
stances and conditions under which the interception of wire and oral
communications may be authorized. To assure the privacy of oral and wire
communications, [T]itle III prohibits all wiretapping and electronic surveil-
lance by persons other than duly authorized law enforcement officers ....
Virtually all concede that the use of wiretapping or electronic
surveillance techniques by private unauthorized hands has little justification
where communications are intercepted without the consent of one of the
participants.
Id. at 66, 69, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2153, 2156.
One of the four congressional findings which accompanied the introduction of
Title III into law read: "To safeguard the privacy of innocent persons, the
interception of wire or oral communications where none of the parties to the
communication has consented to the interception should be allowed only when
authorized [and supervised] by a court of competent jurisdiction .... " Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 801(d), 82 Stat.
197, 211.
39 See S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 4, at 66, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2153
(discussing the legislative origins of Title III).
40 Criminal Laws and Procedures: Hearings on S. 2187-2191, 2578 Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciaqy, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 38-39 (1966) (statement of Sen. McClellan, Chairman of the
Subcommittee, questioning Nicholas Katzenbach, Attorney General of the United
States).
41 See United States v.Jones, 542 F.2d 661, 667 n.10 (6th Cir. 1976) (stating that
at least two of the three bills which became Title III were based on Professor Blakey's
draft statute); see also PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY app. A (1967) (Professor
Blakey's proposed statute). The President's Commission concluded that "[aill private
use of electronic surveillance should be placed under rigid control, or it should be
outlawed." Id. at 203.
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cops, commercial espionage, and marital litigation."42 He was
dismayed that an early version of Title III, the Right of Privacy Act
of 1967,4s would not make all private wiretapping illegal:
The widespread use of electronic surveillance techniques in
this country by private hands is an abomination. I can find no
justification for their use and, thus, I welcome the attempt of the
Right of Privacy Act to strike at these practices.
Insofar as the act deals solely with bugging,... [it] is insuffi-
cient or deficient, and it is deficient, I think, for this reason: It is
based primarily on the commerce clause, and, as a matter of fact,
private bugging in this country can be divided into two broad
categories, commercial espionage and marital litigation ....
[M]ost domestic espionage or domestic snooping would not be
picked up by this statute simply because in most cases it does not
"affect commerce."
So the statute, as it is presently drafted, will not reach what I
would, perhaps, consider a far more fundamental and objection-
able invasion of privacy; that is, an attempt to use electronic
equipment in the invasion of privacy of the home and, particularly,
the marital relationship.
44
Though they were probably unfounded, Professor Blakey's concerns
regarding the Commerce Clause were noted by Congress, and the
final version of Title III included an alternative constitutional
justification to ensure the application of Title III's prohibitions to
domestic wiretapping.
45
42 Telephone Interview with G. Robert Blakey, Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law
School (Nov. 16, 1992). See also Holt, supra note 21, at 205 n.85 ("'Title III was
intended to mean what it says-no surveillance by third parties without warrant-by
cops, spouses, or in business-labor or any other relevant relations.'" (quoting a letter
from Professor Blakey to Holt)).
Professor Blakey later became Reporter of the American Bar Association's
Advisory Committee on the Police Function which concluded that: "Except as
otherwise expressly permitted, the use of electronic surveillance techniques for the
overhearing or recording of wire or oral communications uttered in private without
the consent of one of the parties should be expressly prohibited.... [T]he prohibi-
tion should be enforced with appropriate criminal, civil, and evidentiary sanctions."
AMERICAN BAR Assoc. PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE § l.1(b), at 5 (Approved Draft 1971).
4 See Right of Privacy Act of 1967: Hearings on S. 928 Before the Subcomm. on
Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciaiy, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 1, at 1-4 (1967) (text of the Right of Privacy Act of 1967) [hereinafter
Right of Privacy Hearings].
44 Id. at 412-13 (statement of Professor G. Robert Blakey).
4' Professor Blakey felt that although commercial espionage is obviously regulable
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The senators present at the lengthy debates on the Right of
Privacy Act also recognized the problem of domestic wiretapping.
Senator Long, chairman of the Senate subcommittee analyzing Title
III, stated that
[t]he three large areas of snooping in [the non-governmental] field
are (1) industrial, (2) divorce cases, and (3) politics. So far we
have heard no real justification for continuance of snooping in
these three areas. If any justification exists, we will probably hear
about it in the next few weeks as we expect to explore the terrain
thoroughly.
46
Senator Hruska, another sponsor of Title III, was joined by Senators
Dirksen, Scott, and Thurmond in stating, "[a] broad prohibition is
imposed on private use of electronic surveillance, particularly in
domestic relations and industrial espionage situations."
4 7
Indeed, it becomes obvious from the language of Title III and
its legislative history that Congress intended Title III to ban all
private wiretapping first, and allow specific exceptions later. The
fact that there are no references to exemptions for any form of
domestic relations from the prohibitions of Title III in either the
by Title III under the Commerce Clause,
this is not true in the domestic relations investigation, which involves... a
far more objectionable invasion of privacy. It is, of course, one thing to
overhear a business secret; it is a wholly different matter, however, to place
under surveillance the marital relationship. Electronic surveillance by a
private individual in another's bedroom cuts most sharply against the grain.
Id. at 442 (prepared statement of Professor Blakey). Even though Professor Blakey
was unsure whether the Right of Privacy Act could be constitutionally applied to
domestic wiretapping, he felt that it should be, suggesting that Congress "might be
able to outlaw it all" if it prohibited wiretapping under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 413; see S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 4, at 92, reprinted
in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2180 (explaining congressional intent to avoid constitutional
challenge under the Commerce Clause "by a clear statutory specification of an
alternative constitutional basis for the prohibition," namely, "the right of privacy...
arising under certain provisions of the Bill of Rights and the due process clause of the
14th amendment"). It is unclear how reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment makes
Title III applicable to domestic wiretapping, in that the requirements of due process
apply only to state action. Insofar as Title III is more comprehensive than the
proposed Right of Privacy Act of 1967, however, Professor Blakey's fears are
inapplicable to Title III and its prohibitions are legitimate under the Commerce
Clause. The telephone system, as used both inside and outside of the home, is a
major tool of interstate commerce. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; United States v.
Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 (1941) (stating that the regulation of interstate telephone,
telegraph, and wireless communications is "concededly within" the scope of
congressional power under the Commerce Clause).
6 Right of Privacy Hearings, supra note 43, pt. 5, at 2261.
47 S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 4, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2274.
1993] 2271
2272 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 141:2261
statute or legislative history supports this conclusion. 48  Indeed,
Congress was much more concerned that it was potentially allowing
too great an invasion of privacy in its fight against organized
crime, 49 or that its exceptions would be construed in such a
48 In his treatise on the law of electronic surveillance, Professor James G. Carr
observed:
Relatively little congressional attention was directed toward the need to
control electronic surveillance by private individuals because the issue
presented no controversy. To equate the relative silence on the topic of
interspousal eavesdropping with acceptance of the practice is to misinterpret
the legislative history. The proposal to allow law enforcement surveillance
received more attention because it was and is far more controversial.
CARR, supra note 21, § 3.6, at 3-109 to 3-110. The Sixth Circuit in United States v.
Jones, 542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976), also disputed the inference that the "limited
attention given [by Congress] to private electronic surveillance.., reflected Congress'
equivocation on the scope of Title III in the private sector," arguing instead that
"[tihe more plausible explanation is that it was the consensus of Congress that there
is 'nojustification' for private electronic surveillance, so that debate centered on the
more volatile issue of law enforcement surveillance." Id. at 671.
49 See MichaelJ. Kaplan, Annotation, Construction and Application of Provision of
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18 USCS § 2520) Authorizing Civil
Cause of Action by Person Whose Wire or Oral Communication is Intercepted, Disclosed, or
Used in Violation of Act, 25 A.L.R. FED. 759, 763 (1975) (stating that the Supreme
Court "has noted that [the enforcement provision of Title III] evidences an overriding
congressional concern for the protection of privacy" (citing Gelbard v. United States,
408 U.S. 41 (1972))). See also Holt, supra note 21, at 202 n.81. As Holt points out,
a number of Congressmen expressed such concerns during debates on the issue:
I cannot ignore the potential consequences of placing "legalized" wiretap-
ping and eavesdropping in the hands of any Government agency. These are
weapons which can be so easily corrupted-if for no other reason than they
are so effective in controlling public behavior. Spying on its own citizens
has always been one of the most effective tools of a totalitarian govern-
ment-the object of their use being the destruction of privacy.
114 CONG. REC. 14,482 (1968) (statement of Sen. Long);
What we are asked to do today by title III is to authorize a wholesale
invasion of citizens' privacy across the country.
id. at 16,284 (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier);
This provision means that under the cover of a law to control and regulate
wiretapping or electronic surveillance, the door has been opened to expand
the list of crimes for which taps or bugs could be placed.
This provision is a dangerous invasion of our privacy and our security.
Who knows how far it may extend?
id. at 16,287 (statement of Rep. Dow);
Are we naive enough to think that "legalization" of this dirty business will
result in fewer abuses[?] On the contrary, if we enact title III... as it is
presently drafted, I think we will be providing law enforcement officers with
a license to do wholesale tapping and bugging. Title III is so full of
dangerous loopholes that it could be characterized as a legal fishnet.
id. at 14,713 (statement of Sen. Brewster).
TITLE III AT A CROSSROADS
manner as to allow even some slight degree of private wiretap-
ping.
50
After twenty years of judicial interpretation of Title III, few
courts are willing to argue that the legislative history supports the
notion that Congress intended to exempt domestic wiretapping
from the prohibitions of the Act.51 With regard to parental
wiretapping, the courts are therefore forced to rely on two excep-
tions to Title III to keep it out of the purview of Tide III: the
extension phone exception,52 and the one-party consent excep-
tion.
53
A. The Extension Phone (net Ordinary Course of Business)
Exception
Perhaps the most common tool of household eavesdroppers is
the extension phone. Its use can range from the harmlessly
accidental (the phone rings and two people answer), to the
outrageously purposeful (an extension phone is installed many miles
from home where a voice-activated recorder tapes all incoming and
outgoing calls). 54 While it is doubtful that the first type of eaves-
' As the senators argued in the debates:
We have gone to every length which is proper, we think, to protect people's
privacy. Today, individual privacy is being promiscuously invaded all over
the country. The law is weak. The people who are against this title will talk
about invasion of privacy but, privacy is being invaded today all the time.
Now they are going a bit further. Today snoopers get hired to install tapes
and electronic surveillance devices, and they are getting by with it because
we cannot convict now under the present law; because we have to prove not
only interception, but use.
This tightens the law on the invasion of privacy. That is the very
first thing it does. That is one of its objectives, to correct present law, and
at the same time not deny but permit, under the strictest regulation, court
ordered supervision, and utilization of this technique for the investigation
of crime.
id. at 14,470 (statement of Sen. McClellan);
Not only must we be concerned about the civil liberties aspects of organized
crime. Not only must we be concerned that those whom organized crime
hurts most are those who most need society's protection. We must also be
concerned about the indiscriminate use of electronic devices, which would
be ended by title III.
id. at 12,989 (statement of Sen. Tydings).
" See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 167-80 and
accompanying text.
,2 See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4)X(5)(a)(i).
5' See § 2511(2)(d).
4 See Rickenbaker v. Rickenbaker, 226 S.E.2d 347, 348 (N.C. 1976).
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dropping can or should be regulated under Title III, it is likely that
Title III prohibits the second.
1. Defining "Ordinary"
Title III defines "intercept" as "the aural or other acquisition of
the contents of any . . . communication through the use of any
electronic, mechanical, or other device." 55 Section 2510(5) ex-
cludes from the definition of "electronic, mechanical, or other
device ... any telephone... furnished to the subscriber or user by
a provider of wire or electronic communication service ... and
being used by the subscriber or user in the ordinary course of its
business."56 Because many parental and interspousal wiretapping
cases involve eavesdropping over an extension phone, courts have
been forced to grapple with whether an extension phone is an
"electronic, mechanical, or other device," and thus whether the
"ordinary course of business" encompasses the use of extension
phones in the home. Indeed, courts have made this inquiry so
frequently that § 2510(5)(a) has come to be referred to as the
"Extension Phone Exception" rather than the "Ordinary Course of
Business Exception," at least in domestic wiretapping cases.
57
At first blush, the extension phone exception does not seem to
apply to domestic wiretapping. Taken literally, the statute's
reference to use "in [the] ordinary course of business" should only
apply to commercial activity. 58 Some courts, however, can find
55 § 2510(4).
56 § 2510(5).
57 Like the interspousal exception itself, reference to § 2510(5)(a)(1) as the
"extension phone exception" probably originated in Simpson v. Simpson. See Simpson,
490 F.2d at 809 (stating that § 2510(5)(a)(1) "directly covers" the use of extension
phones in the home); see also People v. Otto, 831 P.2d 1178, 1189 (Cal.), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 414 (1992) (stating that the Simpson court "relied on Title III's so-called
'extension phone' exception").
58 Black's Law Dictionary defines "ordinary course of business" as "[t]he
transaction of business according to the common usages and customs of the
commercial world generally or of the particular community or (in some cases) of the
particular individual whose acts are under consideration." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1098 (6th ed. 1990). "Business" is generally considered commercial activity, although
"[t]hat which habitually busies or occupies or engages the time, attention, labor, and
effort of persons as a principal serious concern or interest" can also be one's business.
Id. at 198; see also RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 185 (1991)
(stating that the seventh definition of "business" is "something with which a person
is rightfully concerned," though the first six are commercial).
One line of cases has applied this logic. In Brggs v. American Air Filter Co., the
court noted that:
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"no persuasive reason why Congress would exempt a business
extension and not one in the home."59 For those courts, that the
extension phone exception applies in the home "is indicative of
Congress's intention to abjure from deciding a very intimate
question of familial relations." 6° This translates into the broader,
yet flawed, conclusion that Title III does not apply to any domestic
wiretapping.
61
Assuming that the exception for telephones used in the
"ordinary course of business" embraces telephones used in the
home, it is possible to see how what may be "ordinary" in a business
setting is not "ordinary" at home, and vice versa. For example, one
might expect calls to be systematically recorded in certain business
or business-like situations (perhaps to enhance 911 emergency
services or to ensure quality control in a telemarketing business);
62
in contrast, one would not expect calls to be monitored at random
it is hard to see how use of an extension telephone to intercept a call
involving non-business matters could be in the "ordinary course of
business," since such activity is unlikely to further any legitimate business
interest. However, interception of calls reasonably suspected to involve non-
business matters might be justified by an employer who had had difficulty
controlling personal use of business equipment through warnings.
630 F.2d 414, 420 n.8 (5th Cir. 1980). Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577
(11th Cir. 1983), added to this analysis, stating that: "[t]his suggests that, if
interception of personal calls is permitted at all, it is permitted only for a very limited
purpose." Id. at 583. One judge in Briggs proposed an even simpler analysis: "I
think the distinction is reasonably clear as to what can and cannot be intercepted:
a business call can be, a private call cannot be." 630 F.2d at 421 (Clark, J.,
concurring).
59 Newcomb v. Ingle, 944 F.2d 1534, 1536 (10th Cir. 1991); see also Simpson, 490
F.2d at 809 ("[I1t is clear that Congress did not intend to prohibit a person from
intercepting a family member's telephone conversations by use of an extension phone
in the family home-[the extension phone exception] directly covers this point.").
60 Simpson, 490 F.2d at 809.
61 See, e.g., Simpson, 490 F.2d at 809 & n.17 (concluding that statements suggesting
congressional awareness of the use of electronic surveillance by individuals in their
homes does not support the proposition that Congress was concerned that such
activities took place); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677,678-79 (2d Cir. 1977)
(concluding that the act of listening to one's wife's and daughter's telephone
conversations from an extension phone in one's own home would certainly be in the
"ordinary course of the user's business") (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)(i)); Newcomb,
944 F.2d at 1536 n.5 (following Anonymous); Platt v. Platt, 685 F. Supp. 208, 209 (E.D.
Mo. 1988) (same), rev'd, 951 F.2d 159 (8th Cir. 1989); Janecka v. Franklin, 684 F.
Supe. 24, 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (same).
2 See e.g., Briggs, 630 F.2d at 420 (holding that the interception of a specific call
based on specific fears of disclosure of confidential business information was not part
of a systematic attempt to intercept calls, and was therefore made in the ordinary
course of business).
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for other, less business-related reasons.63 A recent example of the
latter situation involved the alleged monitoring of certain phone
calls made at the State Department, leading to widespread questions
of whether such eavesdropping is legal under Title 111 .
64
In the home, it probably would not surprise many people to
learn that sometimes one or more of their telephone conversations
are casually and unintentionally overheard over an extension phone
by someone else. Such intrusions on privacy may be expected and
unavoidable, and arguably unpunishable.65 The interceptions are
ordinary in the sense that they are often accidental. They simply do
not fulfill the requirement in Title III that interceptions be
intentional.6 6 In the business setting, courts have held such
"accidental" interceptions to be in the ordinary course of business,
even when the eavesdropping lasted upwards of five minutes.
67
63 See infra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
64 See Robert Pear, High Bush Official is Linked to Search of File on Clinton, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 14, 1992, at 9 ("State Department officials confirmed that the agency's
operations had monitored [the official's] telephone conversations with other
Administration officials .... The [FBI] has opened an inquiry to see if the monitoring
violated Federal wiretap statutes.").
6'5 Even this basic statement may be untrue, however. Take, for example, a point
made by ChiefJustice Warren in considering the nature of extension phones:
Common experience tells us that a call to a particular telephone number
may cause the bell to ring in more than one ordinarily used instrument.
Each party to a telephone conversation takes the risk that the other party
may have an extension phone and may allow another to overhear the conver-
sation. When such takes place there has been no violation of any privacy
of which the parties may complain.
Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107, 111 (1957) (emphasis added) (ruling on the
legality of extension phone eavesdropping under the less protective precursor to Title
III, § 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat.
1064, 1103-04 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1988))). For a discussion of
the differences between Title III and § 605 of the Federal Communications Act, see
United States v. Seidlitz, 589 F.2d 152, 156 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 992
(1979); S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 4, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2196-97.
The negative implication of ChiefJustice Warren's statement is that overhearing
a telephone conversation via extension phone without authorization would be an
invasion of privacy.
66 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a)-(b). The level of intent required to violate Title III
was lowered from "willful" to "intentional" by amendment in 1986. See Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 101(f)(1), 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. (100 Stat.) 1848, 1853.
67 See, e.g., United States v. Axselle, 604 F.2d 1330, 1333-35 (10th Cir. 1979)
(finding, before Title III was amended to lower the level of intent to "intentional,"
that an interception by a motel operator of a guest's conversation for "up to five
minutes" was not "willful"). But see Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 584-
85 (lth Cir. 1983) (arguing that although cases which hold short, accidental
interceptions exempt from Title III "represent sensible applications of the appropriate
TITLE IM AT A CROSSROADS
On the other hand, more systematic interceptions of telephone
conversations via extension telephones raise the intrusion on privacy
to another level of seriousness, 68 especially when the eavesdropper
uses a tape recorder on a regular basis. This distinction makes
intuitive sense. At the most practical level, a recording device is
much more difficult to detect than a person listening in. The tape
recorder, like an electronic wiretap, does not create noises, does not
need sleep, and does not require a constant vigil by the phone.
69
A person who tapes a conversation, even through the simple means
of turning on an answering machine, need not worry about carefully
lifting the receiver in order to avoid detection.70  On a more
substantive level, the act of recording conversations is evidence of
a more systematic and determined effort to invade the privacy of
the intercepted parties. And while one may be able to characterize
legal standard to specific facts," the holding of Axselle "absolutely contradicts the
meaning of the operative language").
68 Indeed, at least in the business setting, courts are quite suspicious of systematic
recording. See e.g., Watkins, 704 F.2d at 583 ("We hold that a personal call may not
be intercepted in the ordinary course of business.., except to the extent necessary
to guard against unauthorized use of the telephone or to determine whether a call is
personal or not."); Briggs v. American Air Filter Co., 630 F.2d 414, 420 n.9 ("A
general practice of surreptitious monitoring would be more intrusive on employees'
privacy than monitoring limited to specific occasions.").
69 One commentator has explained the difference between systematic recording
and individual instances of eavesdropping on extension phones:
There are two vital distinctions between an extension phone and a
wiretap as they are used to intercept private conversations-the degree of
human supervision and the potential product. Extension phone eaves-
dropping requires the presence of the eavesdropper, and therefore human
frailties such as hunger and sleep are limiting factors. Also, as should be
obvious, detection is a real problem to the eavesdropper who uses an
extension phone. All of this necessarily affects the product that can be
realistically derived from this type of surveillance. In contrast, a wiretap
depends upon a minimum of human supervision. After installation, only
periodic visits might be needed for maintenance, and this, as well as the
technical sophistication of a wiretap, dramatically reduces the danger of
detection. The product of such a tap, if desired, can reflect all the
conversations that occur through the phone at all hours of the day.
Therefore, extension phone eavesdropping has much less potential for
violating the privacy of the targeted party, and, more importantly, the
privacy of innocent third parties, than a wiretap.
Holt, supra note 21, at 205-06.
70 Detectability has been quite important to courts in determining that recording
devices are a clear violation of Title III. See e.g., Deal v. Spears, 980 F.2d 1153, 1158
(8th Cir. 1992) ("Deal ordinarily would know (by the 'click' on the line) when the
residential extension was picked up while she was using the store phone; thus her
calls likely would not have been intercepted if the recorder had not been in place.").
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the systematic recording of certain portions of conversations in the
workplace as "ordinary," one would be hard pressed to justify as
"ordinary" systematic recordings in the home. For example, in
United States v. Harpel,7 1 a case in which the defendant recorded
calls via an extension phone, the court held "as a matter of law that
a telephone extension used without authorization or consent to
surreptitiously record a private telephone conversation is not used
in the ordinary course of business. This conclusion comports with
the basic purpose of the statute [and] the protection of privacy."
7 2
2. Applying the Exception
Though the broad holding of the Harpel court may be morally
appealing, 73 other courts have refused to conclude that instances
of surreptitious recording are out of the ordinary, either in the
home or in the business environment. 74 Often, an analysis of what
71 493 F.2d 346 (10th Cir. 1974).
72 Id. at 351; see also Gerrard v. Blackman, 401 F. Supp. 1189, 1193 (N.D. Ill. 1975)
(stating that the interceptions were surreptitious and not in the ordinary course of
business); People v. Otto, 831 P.2d 1178,1190 (Cal.) ("Whatever Congress might have
intended concerning the occasional use of an extension phone by a parent, we find
no evidence of a legislative intent to create a wholesale exception for systematic
interspousal wiretapping [using a recording device]."), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 414
(1992); Rickenbaker v. Rickenbaker, 226 S.E.2d 347, 350 (N.C. 1976) (holding
recording via extension phone installed outside the home not in the ordinary course
of business); State v. Shaw, 404 S.E.2d 887, 889 (N.C. Ct. App.) (holding use of
microcassette recorder to record conversation overheard on an extension line not in
the ordinary course of business), appeal denied, 407 S.E.2d 548 (N.C. 1991).
Other courts have held, however, that because it is not illegal to eavesdrop by
simply picking up the extension phone and listening, "[tihe fact that [the eavesdrop-
per] taped the conversation ... [is] a distinction without a difference." Anonymous
v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677, 679 (2d Cir. 1977); see also Simpson, 490 F.2d at 809;
London v. London, 420 F. Supp. 944, 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding that "Congress
did not intend to proscribe the recording of calls made or received by a family
member over one's own home telephone").
73 For example, noted columnist William Safire argued in a series of editorials that
all nonconsensual recordings of telephone conversations should be prohibited. See
William Safire, Foreign Service Scandal, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 23, 1992, at A17 ("[W]e must
end the dirty business of eavesdropping by secretly recording conversations. Step
One is to vigorously enforce the law against unwarranted snooping... ."); William
Safire, Peeping Tom Lives, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1993, at A15 ("What can we do to
defend ourselves against the relentless penetration of our 'personhood,' injustice
Sandra Day O'Connor's apt word... ? We can start by teaching each other that
eavesdropping.., is all the more wrong now that wearing a wire or planting an FM
bug to entrap is so easy."); Safire, supra note 2, at A17 ("Recording another person's
conversation, when he or she is speaking with a reasonable expectation of privacy, is
ethically repugnant-and in some enlightened states, unlawful.") [hereinafter
collectively referred to as Safire Editorials].
74 Briggs, for example, rejected the broad holding of Harpel, arguing that the
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constitutes the ordinary use of extension phones in a business
setting could lead to exactly the opposite conclusion to that of
ordinary use in the home. For this reason, an ad hoc determination
of whether the use of an extension telephone in a particular case
was ordinary would seem to be required before one could deter-
mine whether Title II had been violated. Nonetheless, courts have
been much more conscientious in applying a rigorous "ordinary
use" analysis on a case-by-case basis to commercial wiretapping than
to domestic wiretapping.7 Indeed, courts applying Title III in the
business setting have been quite discriminating in observing the
differences between personal and business calls, and they have
arrived at different outcomes on the basis of express or implied
consent to monitor calls, the nature and extent of the invasion, and
Harpel analysis would make the ordinary course of business exception "superfluous."
630 F.2d at 419.
7' See, e.g., Deal v. Spears, 980 F.2d 1153, 1158 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding 22 hours
of recordings made over an extension phone in appellee's business not in the
ordinary course of business); Epps v. St. Mary's Hosp., 802 F.2d 412,416-17 (11th Cir.
1986); Briggs, 630 F.2d at 420 (interception of an individual business call for a specific
reason, and not as part of a more systematic monitoring practice, was in the ordinary
course of business); Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 583 (11th Cir. 1983)
(holding, in extending Briggs, that in the business setting, "a personal call may not be
intercepted in the ordinary course ofbusiness under the [ordinary course of business
exception], except to the extent necessary to guard against unauthorized use of the
telephone or to determine whether a call is personal or not"); United States v. Paul,
614 F.2d 115, 117 (6th Cir.) (holding monitoring of prison inmates' calls when
inmates notified of monitoring within the ordinary course of duty of correctional
facility), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 941 (1980); Campiti v. Walonis, 611 F.2d 387, 392 (1st
Cir. 1979) (use of an extension phone by police officer to intercept inmate's
conversation not in the ordinary course as there is no extension phone exception to
Title III); United States v. Axselle, 604 F.2d 1330, 1335 (10th Cir. 1979) (five minute
interception of motel guest's conversation by switchboard operator not a violation of
Title III because call was originally intercepted pursuant to "the procedure followed
at the motel");James v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 591 F.2d 579,581 (10th Cir. 1979)
(monitoring of employee phone calls by supervisor where employees previously
notified falls within the ordinary course exception); Harpel, 493 F.2d at 351 ("We hold
as a matter of law that a telephone extension used without authorization or consent
to surreptitiously record a private telephone conversation is not used in the ordinary
course of business.");Jandak v. Village of Brookfield, 520 F. Supp. 815, 821-25 (N.D.
Ill. 1981) (systematic recording of calls to police station done in the ordinary course
of police business); Gerrard v. Blackman, 401 F. Supp. 1189, 1193 (N.D. II. 1975)
(interception of calls between patient and attorney not done in the ordinary course
of business); United States v. Christman, 375 F. Supp. 1354, 1355-56 (N.D. Cal. 1974)
(interception of calls over closed circuit, in-house telephone system in the ordinary
course of business); United States v. Banks, 374 F. Supp. 321, 326 (D.S.D. 1974)
(monitoring'of party line for reasons other than legitimate business purposes not in
the ordinary course).
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whether the interception of a specific call was in the ordinary course
of business, regardless of a general policy to monitor telephones.
76
Such scrutiny has not been applied to domestic wiretapping.
This could be due, in part, to the fact that courts are accustomed to
applying the "Extension Phone Exception" as opposed to the
"Ordinary Course of Business Exception." 77 The use of this
shorthand reference may lead courts to pass over an analysis of
whether a specific interception in the home was ordinary, relying
instead on a factual determination of whether the phone was an
extension. Indeed, courts regularly use a standard in the business
setting which analyzes how ordinary the eavesdropping was,
78
while rejecting the same approach in considering the home.
79
76 See Watkins, 704 F.2d at 581-85 (discussing each of these elements).
77 See supra note 57 and accompanying text. This difference in terminology may
not be lost on all courts, however. See; e.g., Deal v. Spears, 980 F.2d 1153, 1159 (8th
Cir. 1992) (referring to the "telephone extension/business use exemption of Title
III"); Briggs, 630 F.2d at 419 (referring, for the most part, to the "'ordinary course
of business' exception").
78 See, e.g., Campiti, 611 F.2d at 392 (use of an extension phone by prison guards
to overhear inmate's conversation not "in the ordinary course of business" and
therefore invalid under Title III); Harpel, 493 F.2d at 351 (stating that unauthorized
interception, recording, and disclosure of a conversation between two law enforce-
ment officials was not "in the ordinary course of business" and holding "as a matter
of law" that no recording made via extension telephone could be made "in the
ordinary course of business"); Briggs v. American Air Filter Co., 455 F. Supp. 179,
181 (N.D. Ga. 1978) (accepting Harpel but holding that an employer who intercepted
certain conversations of his employee via extension phone did so "in the ordinary
course of business" because he listened to protect the interests of the company and
not for personal reasons), afTd, 630 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1980); Gerrard v. Blackman,
401 F. Supp. 1189, 1193 (N.D. IM. 1975) (surreptitious interceptions of conversations
between a mental patient and her attorney are "not in the ordinary course of business
unless defendants can establish that it is their ordinary course of business to intercept
conversations between patients and their counsel, a practice which would not be
justified even if customary"); United States v. Christman, 375 F. Supp. 1354, 1356
(N.D. Cal. 1974) (holding interception via an extension telephone attached to a
closed-circuit, in-store telephone system not a violation of Title III); United States v.
Sturdivant, 9 M.J. 923, 924-25 (A.C.M.R. 1980) (extension phone used by sergeant to
intercept soldier's conversations was used "in the ordinary course of business," and
soldiers had no "reasonable expectation of privacy" (suggesting a reliance on Katz)),
rev'd, 13 M.J. 323 (C.M.A. 1982).
79 In the realm of domestic wiretapping, courts generally have not analyzed
specific instances of interceptions to determine if they were ordinary, but instead have
relied on the general assumption that there is an exception for extension telephones
used in the home, even when a recording device is attached to the extension phone.
See, e.g., Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677, 679 (2d Cir. 1977); Simpson, 490
F.2d at 809; London v. London, 420 F. Supp. 944, 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). But see
People v. Otto, 831 P.2d 1178, 1190 (Cal.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 414 (1992);
Rickenbaker v. Rickenbaker, 226 S.E.2d 347, 350 (N.C. 1976); State v. Shaw, 404
S.E.2d 887, 889 (N.C. App.), appeal denied, 407 S.E.2d 548 (1991).
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Beyond its origins as a simple nickname, this approach, though
inconsistent and illogical, seems to stem from a rather isolated
statement made during the legislative hearings on Title III.
Professor Herman Schwartz, one witness at a 1967 House of
Representatives hearing on the problem of wiretapping, has been
cited in many cases80 as saying, "I take it nobody wants to make it
a crime for a father to listen in on his teenage daughter or some
such related problem. I do not know."81 To these courts, Profes-
sor Schwartz's statement shows Congress's "clear" intent to allow
interceptions by family members within the home.8 2 While some
courts and commentators have attempted to downplay Professor
Schwartz's statement by pointing out that it was uttered by a witness
and not by a senator,83 and that it was unique in the legislative
history,84 taken in context the quote has a simpler explanation.
The draft wiretapping bill Professor Schwartz commented on
contained an extension phone exception worded quite broadly,
exempting "an[y] extension telephone furnished to the subscriber
or user by a communications common carrier."85 In his statement
prepared on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union, Professor
Schwartz observed that the exception, as written in the bill,
means that the law does not prohibit any eavesdropping whatsoev-
er, if performed by means of an extension telephone. We are
somewhat at a loss to understand why so broad an exclusion is
created .... Perhaps there is no need or desire to regulate the
situation where the head of a family listens in on a conversation
between his teen-age daughter and her boyfriend, or to find out if
someone is using the phone without authority. Perhaps. But by
80 See e.g., Newcomb v. Ingle, 944 F.2d 1534, 1536 n.5 (10th Cir. 1991);
Anonymous, 558 F.2d at 679; Simpson, 490 F.2d at 809 & n.17; Platt v. Platt, 685 F.
Sup?. 208, 209 (E.D. Mo. 1988), rev'd, 951 F.2d 159 (8th Cir. 1989).
1 Hearings on the Anti-Crime Program Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on
theJudiciaty, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 989 (1967) [hereinafter Hearings on the Anti-Crime
Program] (testimony of Professor Schwartz).
82 The origin of this position is generally credited to Simpson. See supra note 57.
85 See e.g., Lipton, supra note 21, at 149 ("There is no evidence that any member
of Congress ever acknowledged that one of the purposes of the extension phone
exception was to allow a father to eavesdrop on his teenage daughter.").
See e.g., Kratz v. Kratz, 477 F. Supp. 463, 474 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (commenting, in
evaluating the effect of Professor Schwartz's statement on the interspousal exception,
that "[w]hatever Congress thought about the legal rights of minor children vis-a-vis
their parents, this isolated statement by a witness at a congressional hearing certainly
does not warrant the conclusion that Congress viewed husbands and wives as less than
full equals before the law").
8 H.R. 5386, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2515(d)(1) (1967).
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defining "interception" as always excluding use of an extension
phone, the following situations are also excluded from regulation:
(1) an eavesdropper breaks in, hides in one part of
the house or office without the knowledge of
anyone else, and listens in on an extension;
(2) the police or someone else coerce someone into
letting them listen in on an extension phone;
(3) the police or someone else obtain authority to
listen in on an extension phone by someone not
a party to the conversation and who has no
authority of any kind to allow them to do so.
Surely, eavesdropping should be allowed in one of these cases,
but because of the blanket exemption for extension phones, they
are completely exempt from regulation. We would therefore
recommend deletion of [the exception] or at least some kind of
redefinition limiting it to the specific types of cases the draftsmen
had in mind.
86
As his statement shows, Professor Schwartz's concern was not
that the use of extension phones to eavesdrop would be made
illegal, but that it would exempt too many situations he considered
objectionable. The draftsmen apparently took heed of his concerns,
because they added the "ordinary course of... business" language
to qualify the exception, and removed the explicit reference to
extension telephones. 87 Rather than implying that Congress ought
to ignore the situation involving parental tapping of children's
phones, Professor Schwartz's statement implicitly calls for an
evaluation of each situation-be it in the commercial or domestic
setting-to determine the desirability of allowing an exception to the
general prohibitions of Title III. Only in this way does the ordinary
course of business exception make sense.
3. Getting Down to Business
Requiring courts to apply the ordinary course of business
exception evenly in both commercial and domestic wiretapping
cases is neither an impossible nor unprincipled approach to
statutory construction, nor does it place an unreasonable strain on
86 Hearings on the Anti.Cime Program, supra note 81, at 1014-15 (prepared
statement of Professor Schwartz). Professor Schwartz's testimony closely follows the
wording and organization of his prepared statement. Compare id. at 950-91 (testimony
of Professor Schwartz) with id. at 1008-17 (prepared statement of Professor Schwartz).
87 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)(i).
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a court system already burdened by "an avalanche" 88 of such cases.
A similar analytical framework is- presented in Katz v. United
States,89 upon which Title III is based.90 Katz, which involved the
interception by government agents of telephone conversations made
at a public telephone, mandates an analysis of the reasonable
expectations of privacy of a party whose conversations are inter-
cepted via electronic eavesdropping.91 The Katz Court rejected
the long-standing "trespass doctrine" enunciated in Olmstead v.
United States,92 which held that wiretapping does not constitute an
unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment
because a wiretap is not a search of any constitutionally protected
area nor a seizure of anything tangible. 8 Instead, Katz held that
"[o]ne who occupies [a telephone booth], shuts the door behind
him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely
entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will
not be broadcast to the world,"94 and, more fundamentally, that
"the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."
95
Title III analysis should invoke the reasoning employed in Katz
by recognizing the distinction between a right to privacy which
applies to a particular location or form of communication and a
right to privacy based on a person's legitimate expectations in a
given situation.96  Title III already invokes the Katz analysis
88 See supra note 6.
19 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
90 See S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 4, at 66, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2153.
91 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
92 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
93 See id. at 464-66.
14 Katz, 589 U.S. at 352.
95 Id. at 351.
9 One court has implicitly adopted this analysis, holding-
We have been unable to divine any reason for an "extension telephone"
exception. The purpose of the statute is to prohibit the secret monitoring
of wire communications. Its application should not turn on the type of
equipment that is used, but whether the privacy of telephone conversations
has been invaded in a manner offensive to the words and intent of the Act.
Campiti v. Walonis, 611 F.2d 387, 392 (1st Cir. 1979).
This approach has met with some criticism. For example, Professor Blakey has
said, without elaborating, that "Campiti v. Walonis was wrongly decided on every
point." Telephone Interview with G. Robert Blakey, Professor of Law, Notre Dame
Law School (Nov. 16, 1992). Professor Carr suggests another, closely analogous
method for determining what is "ordinary." He argues that Title III "requires that
both the installation and use of the instrument be normal." CAMM, supra note 21,
§ 3.2(d)(1), at 3-42 (emphasis added). Professor Carr believes that:
1993] 2283
2284 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 141:2261
directly by defining "oral communication" as a communication
"uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communi-
cation is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying
such expectation."9 7 Title III's definition of "wire communica-
tion," by contrast, contains no such requirement.
98  Although
some courts have used this difference to reject any reference to
reasonable expectations of privacy, 99 the Supreme Court's analysis
is instructive for, if not dispositive of, an ad hoc analysis of the
ordinary course of business exception. This is not to say that the
Katz analysis should be substituted for an ordinary course of
business analysis. To do so would be, in the words of one court, to
"put[] the cart before the horse," 100 as an individual's reasonable
expectation of privacy is only enforceable if federal law makes the
interception illegal. 1 1 Assuming that an individual pursuing a
Title III action has no other basis under federal law for having an
expectation of privacy, that individual will first have to show that the
interception was not in the ordinary course of business. Nonethe-
less, as the Briggs court observes,
noting that the "ordinary course of business" determination is
logically prior to the conclusion that federal law creates an
enforceable expectation of privacy... by no means... suggest[s]
that the same common experience and behavior which help define
our expectations are irrelevant to the "ordinary course of busi-
ness" issue. If the common experience in this country is that
under certain circumstances, communications made on office
Reliance on the "normal use" exception of § 2510(5)(a)(i) to allow an
eavesdropper to use an extension telephone... reflects a misunderstanding
of the purpose of Title III and a failure to strictly construe its regulatory
structure. The tendency to accept an "extension phone" exemption to the
statute's prohibition of all forms and modes of electronic eavesdropping
would, if implemented, leave the most common means of listening to
another's conversations completely unregulated. Instead of embracing the
extension phone exemption, courts should carefully distinguish between a
use which may be justifiably viewed as normal (i.e., an anxious parent's
understandable overhearing of a drug abusing child's conversations), and
those which cannot so easily be accepted and tolerated in a society which
values and seeks to protect conversational privacy.
Id. § 3.6, at 3-110.2 to 3-110.3 (citations omitted).
97 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2).
98 See § 2510(1).
99 See, e.g., Kratz v. Kratz, 477 F. Supp. 463, 472-73 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (holding a
determination of the victim's justifiable expectation of privacy irrelevant as a grounds
for dismissing a Title III action).
100 Briggs v. American Air Filter Co., 630 F.2d 414, 417 (5th Cir. 1980).
101 See id.
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telephones are not listened to by employers or their agents, it
could not be said that an act of listening to such a conversation is
in the "ordinary course of business."
102
An application of Title III which turns solely on the use of particular
equipment installed in a particular location (namely an extension
phone), without taking into account the circumstances in which the
interception takes place, is, by this analysis, misplaced.
A preferable approach would be to factor in expectations of
privacy by rigorous application of the ordinary course of business
test in both commercial and domestic wiretapping cases.103 This
approach is much more beneficial than an across the board
validation of extension phone interceptions, especially in the home,
as each individual's situation can be analyzed separately. More
importantly, a flexible standard which factors in expectations of
privacy allows courts to determine whether particular methods of
interception are prohibited by Title III. Take, for example, the case
of a child who has a known drug problem, the archetypical case
from whence a justification for parental supervision could
spring. 10 4 If the parent takes an active role in ensuring that her
child is free from drugs, say by enforcing a curfew, taking the child
to counseling, and looking for obvious signs of drug use, then the
child can expect her parent to monitor her calls to a degree to
ensure her safety. In this situation, monitoring could very well be
considered to be in the ordinary course of business.105 On the
other hand, four years of twenty-four hour-a-day surveillance would
probably be unreasonable to expect. 106  A flexible, Katz-like
analysis of instances of parental wiretapping would provide a much
greater degree of privacy than is currently afforded in the home,
102 Id. at 417-18.
103 This view comports with the wishes of Professor Blake', the drafter of Title IIl.
When asked whether the framers of Title III intended the extension phone exception
to apply to the home, Professor Blakey said "It absolutely applies to the home. I wish
we had used a different word than 'business' so it wouldn't be limited to commercial
phones." Telephone Interview with G. Robert Blake', Professor of Law, Notre Dame
Law School (Nov. 16, 1992).104 See supra note 96.
10' See supra note 96 and accompanying text. Even if monitoring is legal, recordings
made via extension phones should not be, following the reasoning of United States v.
Harpel and State v. Shaw. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
106 See ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, supra note 5, at 161 (relating the story of a six-
year period of surveillance, including a four-year stretch of 24-hour monitoring, by
parents of their drug-abusing daughter and describing this incident as a "clear
violation of Title III").
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while allowing reasonable exceptions for situations involving
"understandable" attempts by parents to supervise their children.
Though this approach is novel in its application to domestic
wiretapping, the application of a Katz-like analysis to the ordinary
course of business standard is well-established outside the domestic
setting. Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co. 10 7 is an excellent example.
In Watkins, the employer had a general policy of monitoring sales
calls via a normal extension phone. The employees were told that
they could make personal calls which the supervisor would monitor
only as long as necessary to determine that the calls were not
business-related. 0 8 During lunch one day, Watkins, an employee
of L.M. Berry, received a call from a friend who asked her about a
job interview she had had the previous evening with another compa-
ny.1° 9 The call was monitored, and as a result, Watkins was fired
the next day.110 The Eleventh Circuit argued that to prevail
under the ordinary course of business exception, an employer
must show that the interception of the call beyond the initial
period was in the ordinary course of business. It is not enough for
the Berry Co. to claim that its general policy is justifiable as part
of the ordinary course of business. We have no doubt that it is.
The question before us, rather, is whether the interception of this
call was in the ordinary course of business.
111
The court held that the answer to the question was a triable issue of
fact, and remanded to the district court.1 2 A similar type of per-
call analysis should be applied across the spectrum of private
wiretapping.
In light of the relative clarity and uniformity of decisions which
apply the ordinary course of business exception in the business
setting, it seems strange that domestic wiretapping decisions have
thus far failed to follow the same path. Perhaps the explanation
107 704 F.2d 577 (11th Cir. 1983).
108 See id. at 579.
109 See id.
110 See id. Watkins was called into her supervisor's office and told that the
company did not want her to leave. When she asked whether she was being fired, she
was told about the interception of her call. Tempers flared and Watkins was fired.
She complained to her supervisor's boss and the boss had Watkins reinstated. Within
a week, Watkins left L.M. Berry to go to the employer she had interviewed with the
night before the interception of her call. See id.
I" Id. at 582 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The court went on to note
that "[t]he phrase 'in the ordinary course of business' cannot be expanded to mean
anything that interests a company." Id.
112 See id. at 585.
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relates to the "squeamishness" federal courts exhibit when dealing
with domestic relations. For example, in the recent case of Shaver
v. Shaver,113 the court devoted an entire section of its opinion to
its reservations about hearing a Title III case involving interspousal
wiretapping, stating that:
As a general rule, federal courts do not become involved with
domestic relations disputes. The court would prefer to adhere to
the general rule at the present time, but it is unable to do so. The
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has declared that [Title III] and
the civil action which it creates are intended to reach domestic
relations cases. Therefore, the court must rule on the claims
presented by plaintiff.
14
The squeamishness problem is at the center of an historical
debate regarding parental authority between those who favor adult-
like rights for children versus those who favor a quasi-constitutional
right to parental autonomy. This debate, discussed below,115 may
provide a basis for distinguishing domestic wiretapping from other
113 799 F. Supp. 576 (E.D.N.C. 1992).
114 Id. at 577 (citations omitted); see also Pritchard v. Pritchard, 732 F.2d 372, 374
(4th Cir. 1984) (noting that state courts are better suited to handle domestic conflicts,
but nonetheless holding that Title III encompasses interspousal surveillance). But see
Kratz v. Kratz, 477 F. Supp. 463, 476 (E.D. Pa. 1979):
Our case is a simple one; we deal here only with a fundamental and
cherished human right, that of privacy. The enjoyment of that right has
been seriously imperiled by modern technology, prompting Congress to
enact Title III as a barrier to further encroachment on such enjoyment.
Since the right of privacy has been afforded federal statutory protection,
there is nojustification for a federal court, presented with an "interspousal"
Title III suit, to dismiss that suit by stating that it involves only a "domestic
conflict."
Id.
Notwithstanding most courts' squeamishness, a recent Supreme Court decision
may reflect a trend among courts to loosen the strictures of the domestic relations
exception and pave the way for increased federal involvement in domestic disputes.
In Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 112 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (1992), the Court reaffirmed the
domestic relations exception to federal diversityjurisdiction on the basis of a century
and a halfofjudicial decisions made with congressional acceptance. Nonetheless, the
Ankenbrandt Court expressly held that the domestic relations exception exists as a
matter of statutory construction, and is not constitutionally mandated by Article III.
See id. at 2210-11. Cf. Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 591 (1858)
(establishing the domestic relations exception as an extension of the judicial power
granted in Article III). In doing so, the Court may have created the possibility of
discretionary jurisdiction over domestic relations cases in the federal courts. See
Ankenbrandt, 112 S. Ct. at 2217 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
115 See infra part III.
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situations despite the lack of support for such a distinction in Title
III.
B. The Issue of One-Party Consent
Another issue raised in parental wiretapping cases is Title III's
exception for consensual interceptions. Section 2511(2)(d) exempts
from liability any person who intercepts a communication "where
such person is a party to the communication or where one of the
parties to the communication has given prior consent to such
interception." 116 In most situations, determining whether consent
has been given is rather straightforward: either it has or it has not.
In situations involving children, however, determining the existence
of consent can be more difficult, as a parent may be able to consent
on behalf of the child if the parent is acting in the child's "best
interests."
Although courts interpreting the exception have read "consent"
rather broadly, exempting consensual interceptions made for almost
any reason, 117 the legislative history of § 2511(2)(d) suggests a
narrower exception. Senator Hart, sponsor of the one-party consent
exception, proposed "to prohibit a one-party consent tap, except for
law enforcement officials, and for private persons who act in a
defensive fashion." 118 Senator Hart gave the situation in which
"the party acts out of a legitimate desire to protect himself and his
own conversations from later distortions or other unlawful or
injurious uses by the other party"119 as an example of a legitimate
consensual tap.
Despite this legislative history, some parents have argued that
their interception of their children's conversations does not violate
Title III, noting that because wiretapping was in the children's "best
interest," the children constructively consented to it.120 Although
116 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (1988).
117 Most commonly, one-party consent is used as a defense by informers who
monitor or wiretap for law enforcement purposes. See Clifford S. Fishman, The
Interception of Communications Without a Court Order Title III, Consent and the
Expectation of Privacy, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 41, 78 (1976) ("When the consenting
participant [to an intercepted conversation] is an undercover police officer, a paid
informant, a crime victim seeking redress or protection, or a public-spirited citizen,
a finding of voluntary consent is almost automatic.").
118 114 CONG. REC. 14,694 (1968) (statement of Sen. Hart). One commentator
has suggested, without elaboration, that Senator Hart's statement "is inconsistent in
tone with the provision itself." FISHMAN, supra note 6, § 25.4, at 225.
119 Id.
120 See Thompson v. Dulaney, 970 F.2d 744, 749 (10th Cir. 1992) (reversing and
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this argument has not been fully explored by the courts, 121 it is
clear that the issue will have to be addressed.
The issue of consent is not unique to parental wiretapping
cases. 122 Besides cases involving informants in the context of law
enforcement, 123 the consent exception is raised most frequently
in the business setting, where it is argued that employees consent to
monitoring and recording through actual or implied consent.
124
As in the debate over extension phones, the issue of consent has
been much more rigorously addressed this setting than in the home,
and indeed, courts have held businesses to a rather strict standard
of consent.125 For example, in Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co.,
126
the court held that mere acceptance of employment "with knowl-
edge of [a] monitoring policy" did not create actual or implied
consent to all interceptions:
It is clear, to start with, that Watkins did not actually consent
to interception of this particular call. Furthermore, she did not
consent to a policy of general monitoring. She consented to a
policy of monitoring sales calls but not personal calls. This
consent included the inadvertent interception of a personal call,
but only for as long as necessary to determine the nature of the
call ....
Consent under title III is not to be cavalierly implied. Title III
expresses a strong purpose to protect individual privacy by strictly
limiting the occasions on which interception may lawfully take
remanding to the district court for determination of whether parent can give
constructive consent for wiretapping); Platt v. Platt, 951 F.2d 159, 161 (8th Cir. 1989)
(same); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677, 679-80 (2d Cir. 1977) (failing to
reach this argument although it was made by the parent);Janecka v. Franklin, 684 F.
Supp. 24,26 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (relying on Anonymous and Simpson to reject this claim).
The cases cited supra note 120 were decided on the grounds that Title III does
not apply to domestic wiretapping at all; therefore, they did not reach the issue of
whether the child impliedly consented to the tapping.
122 The issues surrounding a child's capacity to consent and whether a parent can
consent for his or her child come up in many areas of the law, including medical care,
child custody hearings, delinquency proceedings, and education. See generally
CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT (Gary B. Melton et al. eds., 1983) (addressing
issues surrounding children's capacity to engage in complex decision making).
123 See supra note 117.
124 See FISHMAN, supra note 6, § 25.2, at 218 (stating that the argument that
employees explicitly or implicitly consented to monitoring is a potential defense to
the application of Title III to employers).
125 Each of the cases cited supra note 75 contains a discussion of the effect of
employee consent on the wiretapping or monitoringat issue, whereas few if any cases
in the domestic setting discuss the effect of consent on wiretapping in that context.
See supra note 120.
12704 F.2d 577 (11th Cir. 1983).
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place .... It would thwart this policy if consent could routinely
be implied from circumstances.
127
Courts have limited findings of implied consent in the business
setting to very narrow circumstances, where it was abundantly clear
that the victim of the interception should have known that the
phone was being monitored. 128  The same is not true of the
application of the consent exception to parental wiretapping.
Arguing that children consent to having their conversations
intercepted implies that children not only can, but wish to give up
their right to privacy to the interests of their parents. In a generally
harmonious family, such presumptions may have their place.
129
Indeed, in the present state of the law, analyses of the "best
interests" of the child begin from this presumption:
In the eyes of the law, to be a child is to be at risk, dependent,
and without capacity or authority to decide free of parental
control what is "best" for oneself. To be an adult is in law
perceived as free to take risks, with the independent capacity and
authority to decide what is "best" for oneself and without regard
to parental wishes. To be an adult who is a parent is therefore to be
presumed by law to have the capacity, authority, and responsibility
127 Id. at 581 (citation omitted).
128 See, e.g., Jandak v. Village of Brookfield, 520 F. Supp. 815, 824-25 (N.D. Ill.
1981) (holding that "in the unusual circumstances of this case," the police officer
should have known that phone lines were continuously monitored for proper police
purposes and therefore consented); Simmons v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 452 F.
Supp. 392, 396 (W.D. Okla. 1978) (concluding that plaintiff knew that calls made on
a business phone were regularly monitored because he had been warned not to use
the phone for personal calls and was provided with an unmonitored phone), af/'d, 611
F.2d 342 (10th Cir. 1979).
129 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrrIONAL LAw 1590 n.8 (2d ed.
1988) (arguing that "routine cases of parental discipline in an essentially successful
family whose continuation is mutually desired will properly be treated as raising no
real constitutional issue," but will raise an issue if the family is in disarray). Others
argue that even in an intact family, conflicts of interest can undermine the
justification for "substituting" the judgment of the parent for that of the child:
The concept of substituted judgment [in which an adult provides a kind of
proxy consent] presumes a great deal. Most notably, it assumes that the
person making the decision is willing and able to act in this capacity on the
child's best interests (i.e., without a conflict of interests). Even within the
loving, intact, two-parent family, not all parental decisions regarding
children are without conflicts of interest. Parents often subordinate their
needs and preferences to the best interests of their children (or to what they
believe to be their children's best interests), but this is not always the case.
Gerald P. Koocher, Children Under Law: The Paradigm of Consent, in REFORMING THE
LAW 3, 14 (Gary B. Melton ed., 1987) (citation omitted).
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to determine and to do what is "good" for one's children, what is
"best" for the entire family.1
3 0
The law assumes, from the very moment a baby is "assigned" to her
natural parents, that the parents will provide the child with the
proper environment and strive to serve her best interests.13 1 In
the majority of parental wiretapping cases reported, however, the
family unit has fallen apart or seems to be deteriorating.
13 2
Indeed, in only one of the cases involving parental wiretapping
3 3
were the parents of the child not divorced or seeking a divorce.
The interceptions were not effected for the interests of the child,
but to give the parent leverage in the settlement of custody bat-
tles.
134
Given this situation, determining what is "best" for a child is a
dubious proposition. When society has determined that a particular
activity is universally wrong, the presumption that parents so acting
are doing so in the "best interest" of the child is doubly suspect.
'3 °JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 7 (1979)
(endnote omitted).
131 Some argue that it is fallacious to assume that the best interests of parents and
children are always aligned. For example, Hillary Rodham Clinton has stated:
the presumption of identity of interests between parents and their children
should be rejected whenever the child has interests demonstrably indepen-
dent of those of his parents (as determined by the consequences to both of
the action in question), and a competent child should be permitted to assert
his or her own interests.
Hillary Rodham, Children Under the Law, 43 HARV. EDUC. REV. 487, 507 (1973).
Others argue that children's rights should be presumptively equal to those of
adults: "There must be strongjustification for any impairment for [children's] legal
rights and for the imposition of any disabilities or incapacities [under the law]. It is
naive to assume that rules derived from feudal times are actually protective and serve
the best interests of modern children." HENRY H. FOSTER, JR., A "BILL OF RIGHTS"
FOR CHILDREN 60 (1974). For a fuller discussion of this debate, see infra part III.
132 See supra note 7. For a discussion of the status of the homes involved in Title
HI actions, see generally Christopher J. Sternberg, Note, Interspousal Wiretapping:
Defining "Marital Home"for Purposes of Civil Recovery Under Title III, 28J. FAM. L. 771
(1989).
133 See State v. Shaw, 404 S.E.2d 887 (N.C. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 407 S.E.2d 548
(N.C. 1991).
134 See Koocher, supra note 129, at 14 (arguing that conflicts of interests between
parent and child could negative the inference that the parent is acting in the best
interests of the child). Cf. DePlanche v. Califano, 549 F. Supp. 685, 702 (W.D. Mich.
1982) (rejecting a father's attempt to secure his children's addresses from the Social
Security Administration where father asserted that he consented on behalf of his
children to release the addresses, noting that "[p]laintiff seeks his children's address
for his own use, while his children seek no information from the Social Security
Administration").
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The justification for allowing the state to intervene in the home and
usurp parental autonomy to enforce a clearly defined public policy
is at its strongest in this situation, 5 5 suggesting that courts should
require proof of adherence to Title III's procedural requirements
in all situations. This would require determining whether or not the
child "consented" to interception in the first place.
The attempt to arrive at such a determination could be a
journey into the ridiculous. If courts applied the standard they use
to decide business cases to parental wiretapping, parents might be
asked to show that their child was informed, in writing, that her
calls were being monitored, and that the child knew or should have
known that specific personal calls were overheard. Furthermore, it
is doubtful that a finding of consent would have any meaning given
the unequal balance of authority between children and their
parents.' 36 To top it off, sociologists and psychologists have
135 Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit argue, for example, that there are
two distinct responses to the question, "What shouldjustify substituting the
state's judgment for that of parents with regard to the care of a particular
child?" The first has been to set relatively precise limits on parental
judgment concerning matters about which there is a clear societal
consensus. For example, parents are not free to send their children into the
labor market or to refuse to let them attend school or be immunized against
certain contagious diseases. Legislative enactments like those concerned
with child labor, compulsory education, and immunization are infringements
upon parental autonomy which give parents fair warning of what constitutes
a breach of their child care responsibilities and provide advance notice of
the extent of the state's power to intervene. In thus defining the authority
to intrude in precise terms, legislatures also restrict the power of administra-
tive agencies and courts to breach the state's general commitment to family
privacy and parental autonomy.
GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 130, at 15-16 (footnote omitted). The second response,
which is the focus of the book, requires judges and state agencies to act as "pare=
patriae with almost limitless discretion in areas generally under the exclusive control
of parents." Id. at 17. Subjects of the second response include child neglect, custody
disputes, and situations involving placement of the child away from parents.
An example of a situation where child/parent conflict may provide ajustification
for usurping parental authority is in the debate over abortions for minors. When a
parent refuses to give permission to allow a minor child to have an abortion, the
parent and child are deemed to be in such a "fundamental[ ] ... conflict" that
notions of "safeguarding... the family unit and of parental authority" are unlikely
to be persuasive. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976). Although
the wiretapping issue may not rise to the fundamental level presented by abortion,
conflicts over privacy may have profound effects on the family relationship and on
parental control. This could lead to problems far greater than those claimed tojustify
the original eavesdropping.
136 A child can do little but agree to consent as required by their parent, due to
the "inherent inequality between adult and child." GOLDSTEIN ETAL.,supra note 130,
at 13 & n.17. "Consent" in this sense is not meaningful in terms of ensuring that the
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expressed concern about children's capacity to consent where the
child is forced to assume a decision-making role.
13 7
Alternatively, one could argue that the consent standard as
applied through Title III to children does not really require a
finding of "consent" in the strict sense of the word. There is a
substantive difference between the demands made on children in
the "hard cases" and those made on children in the Title III sense.
Decisions concerning abortion, medical treatment, juvenile
delinquency, educational choices, and other "hard cases," require
children to act as though they were adults in deciding how to order
their lives.13 8  The consent requirement of Title III does not
require such highly developed decision-making skills-it is perhaps
better thought of as a notice requirement which demands that
children be informed of the wiretapping and understand the effect
the wiretap will have on their privacy. 3 9 In dealing with adult
child understands what they are giving up.
137 See Gary B. Melton, Decision Making by Children, in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE
TO CONSENT 21, 32 & n.15 (Gary B. Melton et al. eds., 1983) (discussing the harmful
consequences of children making bad decisions related to privacy concerns); Maxine
Wolfe, Childhood and Privacy, in 3 HuMAN BEHAVIOR AND ENVIRONMENT: ADVANCES
IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 175, 216 (Irwin Altman &Joachim F. Wohlwill eds., 1978)
discussing the relationship between autonomy and the child's ability to make choices);
Lloyd L. Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 60
(1979) (considering the capacity of a child to consent in the context of consenting to
Fourth Amendment searches).
138 See generally CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT, supra note 137 (addressing
issues surrounding children's capacity to engage in the complex decision making
required to consent to medical treatment, psychotherapy, delinquency proceedings,
and the like). Perhaps Justice Douglas's appreciation of the child's ability to make
difficult choices prompted his dissent in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972),
where he argued that:
It is the future of the student, not the future of the parents, that is
imperiled by today's decision. If a parent keeps his child out of school
beyond the grade school, then the child will be forever barred from entry
into the new and amazing world of diversity that we have today. The child
may decide that that is the preferred course, or he may rebel. It is the
student's judgment, not his parents', that is essential if we are to give full
meaning to what we have said about the Bill of Rights and of the right of
students to be masters of their own destiny. If he is harnessed to the Amish
way of life by those in authority over him and if his education is truncated,
his entire life may be stunted and deformed. The child, therefore, should
be given an opportunity to be heard before the State gives the exemption
which we honor today.
Id. at 245-46 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (footnote omitted).
139 Koocher suggests that it may be more appropriate to give children the power
to "assent," or the power to veto, rather than the power to "consent," which implies
a "reasoned and voluntary acquiescence." Koocher, supra note 129, at 13. He argues
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victims of wiretapping, who have an individual capacity to grant or
withhold consent to monitoring, the strict requirement of consent
makes sense as a formal way of ensuring notice. For children in the
home, however, formal notice requirements are impractable.
Instead, the law might require the presence of conditions we
associate with the "spirit" of consent.
At least one sociologist who studies the issue of children's
capacity to consent has noted that research analyzing the manage-
ment of access to children's private space "tells us something about
day-to-day parent-child relations and also has some legal rele-
vance." 140 According to Melton, such studies relate to the legality
of searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment, "particularly
concerning the issue of the breadth of [the] reasonable expectation
of privacy." 141 This provokes the question: "Under what circum-
stances do youngsters in fact have a reasonable expectation of
privacy?" 142 This suggests that consent implicates and affects the
Katz-based "expectations" analysis proposed above. 143 In sociolog-
ical terms, the reasonable expectations of privacy and capacity to
consent have been described as the existence and degree of a child's
"control/choice" in the family.144 Control/choice is a variable
element in a system of privacy which consists of two elements:
privacy as interaction management, involving choices about how,
where, and when to interact with others; and (more importantly for
purposes of Title III) privacy as information management, which
"relates to the individual's desire to manage past and present
information about him/herself." 45 Not surprisingly, the degree
of control/choice we expect and need increases as we grow, rising
from a complete lack of control/choice as infants (where adults
control our interactions) to a high level of control choice as
adolescents and young adults. 146 A child's development can be
that "little risk is accrued by permitting minors to make [routine] decisions on their
own, while there may be substantial benefit." Id.
140 Melton, supra note 137, at 32.
141 Id. at 32 n.15; see also Weinreb, supra note 137, at 60 (addressing children's
capacity to consent to Fourth Amendment searches).
142 Melton, supra note 137, at 32 n.15.
143 See supra notes 89-112 and accompanying text.
144 See Wolfe, supra note 137, at 180.
145 Id. at 178.
146 See id. at 183-90. Wolfe engages in a "brief trip through childhood and
adolescence, attempting to point out the privacy- related aspects of children's lives."
Id. at 184. This description is quite illuminating as a basis for determining the
reasonable expectations of privacy of various age groups.
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negatively affected when her degree of control/choice in managing
information lags behind her increasing need for it. 147
As applied to Title III, the control/choice indicators reflect the
serious need for some form of consent to invasions of privacy, while
at the same time suggesting a reasonable level of consent required
in different situations by different children. At the same time, the
control/choice standard requires much less than a strict finding of
"consent." This provides a flexibility that is similar to the reason-
able expectation of privacy standard as applied to the ordinary
course of business. Indeed, it would seem that the ordinary course
of business standard and the consent requirement are linked by this
commonality. 148 In order to conform to the spirit of Title III,
which regards nearly all instances of nonconsensual wiretapping
illegal, parents simply need to ensure that their children understand
that their phone conversations can or will be monitored or
recorded. 149  This requirement may very well ruin parents'
surreptitious attempts to catch their children doing what their
parents do not want them to do; yet informing children of the
possibility that they will be caught may be more effective at stopping
those "wrongful" actions than surreptitiously invading their privacy,
and implicitly, their trust.
II. THE JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF DOMESTIC WIRETAPPING
AT A CROSSROADS
The debate among the courts as to whether Title III applies to
domestic wiretapping has been characterized by a rather large
philosophical split. Although the judicial history of interspousal
wiretapping has been well documented over the past fifteen to
twenty years, 150 with the balance of decisions firmly in favor of
holding Title III applicable to interspousal wiretapping, the courts
147 See id. at 215. "Children's and adolescents' descriptions of information
management experiences involve the attempts of others to lessen their autonomy, i.e.,
experiences with the loss of control over information which have negative conse-
quences for the child or adolescent. With age, unsuccessful information management
experiences (invasions) become increasingly associated with 'deviant' behavior." Id.
148 This link is implicitly reflected in many of the business wiretapping cases,
where courts often use the existence of express or implied consent to determine
whether the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy relative to the normal
business operations of the employer. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
149 Of course, no monitoring is better than informed monitoring, but at least
informed monitoring complies with Title II.15 See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
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have reached a crossroads at which they must decide whether to
apply Title III to a wider class of cases, including, most notably,
parental wiretapping. It is, therefore, helpful to discuss briefly the
history of interspousal wiretapping cases before hypothesizing
whether the philosophical split has or will continue to plague Title
III analysis in the parental area.
A. A Brief History: The Split Between Simpson and
United States v. Jones
The interspousal exception to Title III was created in 1974 by
Simpson v. Simpson,151 which held that the statute did not apply to
domestic conflicts, despite the fact that "[t]he naled language of
Title III, by virtue of its inclusiveness" was applicable to the
case.152 The court found that "Congress has not, in the statute,
committee reports, legislative hearings, or reported debates
indicated either its positive intent to reach [domestic wiretapping]
or an awareness that it might be doing so. " 153 After citing the
relative paucity of congressional statements regarding private
electronic surveillance, the Simpson court found two other factors
"important": the extension phone exception, and the fact that the
defendant in the case-a man who intercepted and recorded the
"mildly compromising" conversations of his wife with another
man 15 4-would be held criminally liable if the court found that
Title III applied to the case.155 On this basis, the court "conclud-
ed that the statute is not sufficiently definite and specific to create
a federal cause of action for the redress of appellant's grievances
against her former husband."
156
Although the Simpson court was "not without doubts about [its]
decision," and though the decision was limited to the facts of the
case, 157 a number of decisions have relied on and extended
Simpson's holding. 158 Anonymous v. Anonymous 5' is typical both
151 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974).
152 Id. at 805.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 804.
155 See id. at 809.
156 Id. at 810.
157 Id.
158 See e.g., Newcomb v. Ingle, 944 F.2d 1534, 1535 & n.3 (10th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 903 (1992); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677, 679 (2d Cir.
1977); Perfit v. Perfit, 693 F. Supp. 851, 854-56 (C.D. Cal. 1988); Lizza v. Lizza, 631
F. Supp. 529, 532-33 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
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of cases which follow Simpson and of cases which involve parental
wiretapping. 160 The defendant in Anonymous used the record
feature of an answering machine to intercept and record conversa-
tions between his ex-wife and their daughter.161 Adopting the
reasoning and statutory analysis of Simpson, the Anonymous court
held that "[tihe facts ... present a purely domestic conflict-a
dispute between a wife and her ex-husband over the custody of their
children-a matter clearly to be handled by the state courts."
162
Anonymous also relied on the extension phone exception: "[W]e,
like Professor Schwartz, assume that 'nobody wants to make it a
crime' for a father to listen in on conversations between his wife
and his eight year old daughter, from his own phone, in his own
home."163 The court reached this conclusion despite the fact that
the father both recorded the conversations1 64 and was under a
court order to leave the room when his daughter was speaking to
her mother on the telephone. 165 The Anonymous court did,
however, narrow the holding in Simpson somewhat by distinguishing
the situation at hand from one where all incoming and outgoing
calls are recorded, thereby "invad[ing] the privacy of innumerable
persons, known and unknown."
166
159 558 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1977).
160 Two other cases which follow Simpson involve parental wiretapping. one has
been reversed. See Platt v. Platt, 685 F. Supp. 208, 209-10 (E.D. Mo. 1988) (applying
Anonymous and Simpson where a mother taped conversations between her husband
and their daughter), rev'd, 951 F.2d 159 (8th Cir. 1989) (rejecting the district court's
reliance on Simpson and Anonymous, and remanding for a determination of the nature
of parent's recordings); Janecka v. Franklin, 684 F.Supp. 24, 26-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(concerning a father who had taped conversations between his former wife and their
children), af'd, 843 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1988). It is interesting to note that theJanecka
court came "exceedingly close" to imposing Rule 11 sanctions on the plaintiffs, but
did not because "plaintiffs may have sincerely believed that the Court would seek to
limit the scope of Anonymous." Id. at 27. Janecka was decided in the Second Circuit;
therefore, the court was bound by the decision in Anonymous.
161 Anonymous, 558 F.2d at 678.
162 Id. at 679.
163 Id. For a discussion of why this statement is misused, see supra notes 80-87
and accompanying text.
164 The court held that "[t]he fact that appellee here taped the conversations
which he permissibly overheard... [is] a distinction without a difference." Id. (citing
Simpson, 490 F.2d at 809). The "difference" may be that recordings move the
interception away from a simple inadvertent overhearing via extension phone and
toward the realm of a more systematic invasion of privacy. See supra part I.A.
165 Anonymous, 558 F.2d at 678 n.3. The spirit, if not the letter, of the court order
to stay out of the room was, of course, abrogated to a degree by the defendant's tape
recordings.
166 Id. at 679. The plain language of Title III, of course, makes no such
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The first departure from the analysis in Simpson came two years
later in a Sixth Circuit case, United States v. Jones.167 Reviewing
the same legislative materials, the Sixth Circuit found the holding
in Simpson "untenable because it contradicts both the explicit
language of the statute and the clear intent of Congress expressed
in the Act's legislative history."1 8s The court found it "clear ...
that the Congress enacted Title III to protect the privacy of all
persons conversing over the telephone and that their privacy is
shielded from invasion by third parties and spouses alike."
169
Numerous courts followed on the heels ofJones, rejecting Simpson's
analysis of Title III and the application of the interspousal immunity
doctrine to wiretapping.
170
The most caustic of the attacks on Simpson, exemplary (in all but
its excess) of the recent trend among courts, comes from Kratz v.
Kratz.171  Lowell Kratz, suspicious that his wife Mildred was
having an affair, had a recording device installed on the telephone
in his home. 172 When Mildred brought an action under Title III
for the interception of her calls, Lowell relied on Simpson to claim
that the lack of congressional intent to include interspousal
wiretapping in Title III precluded liability. 178 Chief Judge Lord
of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania began his analysis of Lowell's
arguments with the observation that: "We would summarily dismiss
such a fallacious approach to statutory interpretation had it not
been the one adopted by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Simpson v. Simpson."174 Pointing out that it "is difficult to imagine
a statutory prohibition more 'definite and specific' than that of
[Title III],"17 1 Judge Lord criticized "then-Judge (and now former
Attorney General) Bell" for his "most unusual and improper method
of statutory analysis... [in] creat[ing], of his own accord, an
exception to Title III not found in the statute, and ... in flagrant
disregard of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1), which states that all exceptions to
distinction-it prohibits any interception by any person, and allows any aggrieved
person to bring suit. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
167 542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976).
168 Id. at 667.
169 Id. at 670.
170 See supra note 20.
171 477 F. Supp. 463 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
172 Id. at 465-66.
173 Id. at 467.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 468 (quoting Simpson, 490 F.2d at 810).
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Title III have been provided specifically in the statute." 176 "[I]gnor-
ing traditional principles of statutory interpretation," 177 Judge
Lord continued, "the Simpson court engaged in judicial legislation
by reading the plain words of Title III ("any person") to mean
something other than what they said. Butjudges are not legislators,
and this Humpty-Dumpty method of jurisprudence has no place in
our constitutional system." 178 Needless to say (but six pages
later 179) Judge Lord concluded that Simpson was wrong and that
no interspousal exception to Title III exists.
180
B. A Classic Distinction Without a Difference
Though the vast majority of courts have rejected Simpson in
favor of Jones as applied to interspousal wiretapping, courts have
been less willing to followJones where the aggrieved person is not
an adult, but a child whose privacy has been violated. This trend is
exemplified best by two recent decisions in the Tenth Circuit: Heggy
v. Heggy 181 and Newcomb v. Ingle,182 handed down a little over
a month from each other and printed back-to-back in the reporter.
Heggy is typical of cases which follow United States v. Jones. Tom
Heggy placed a voice-activated tape recorder on an extension
telephone located in a barn next to his home in order to record the
conversations of his wife whom he was in the process of divorc-
ing.183 The court felt it was "compelled first and foremost by the
clear and unambiguous language of the statute" to conclude that
Title III applies to interspousal wiretapping. 184 Referring to Title
III's prohibition on the interception of communications "by any
person except as specifically provided in the statute," the court found
176 Id.
177 d.
178 Id. at 469-70 (citation to Lewis Carroll omitted).
179 In the remaining pages, the words "untenable," "misread," "illogical,"
"backhanded," and "vague," among others, were used to describe Judge Bell's
opinion. Id. passim.
180 See id. at 476. Judge Lord also summarily rejected reliance on Mildred's
expectation of privacy, the existence of an extension phone exception, the
applicability of the doctrine of interspousal immunity, Lowell's assertions that Title
III was not a valid exercise of the Commerce Clause or that it violated Due Process,
and the applicability of the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction. See
id. at 472-76.
181 944 F.2d 1537 (10th Cir. 1991), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 1514 (1992).
182 944 F.2d 1534 (10th Cir. 1991), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 903 (1992).
183 See Heggy, 944 F.2d at 1538.
184 Id. at 1539.
1993) 2299
2300 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 141:2261
the statute "clear on its face, [making] resort to legislative history
... seem unnecessary. " 185 Even so, the court addressed Simpson
head on, stating:
We reject not only the Simpson court's method of statutory analysis
but also its interpretation of the legislative history. Instead, we
agree with the district court [below] that the legislative history of
Title III evinces a congressional awareness of the widespread use
of electronic eavesdropping in domestic relations cases and an
intent to prohibit such eavesdropping.
86
The court finally
reject[ed the] contention that interpreting Title III to reach
interspousal wiretapping results in unwarranted federal intrusion
into the law of domestic relations, a subject traditionally left to
state regulation.... It is highly unlikely... that applying Title III
to interspousal wiretapping will result in increased federal
regulation of domestic relations. Rather, the more likely result is
a decrease in interspousal wiretapping.
8 7
The language of Heggy stands in sharp contrast to the analysis of
another panel of the Tenth Circuit in Newcomb v. Ingle.1
88
Newcomb's custodial parent intercepted and recorded telephone
conversations between her minor son Brent and her ex-husband
within her own home. 189 In one of the recorded conversations,
Brent's father could be heard instructing Brent as he set fire to his
mother's home.' 90 Brent's mother turned the tapes over to Ingle,
an assistant county attorney, who prosecuted both father and
son.1 91 When Brent reached majority he filed suit against Ingle,
his mother, and his grandfather (who had helped his mother install
the recording device) alleging, among other things, a violation of
Title 111.192
Though the Newcomb court analogized the case to one "where
spouses have tapped one another," the court pointed out, without
elaborating, that it "is still qualitatively different from a custodial
parent tapping a minor child's conversations within the family
home." 193  The court held that Title III did not apply
185 Id. at 1540 (emphasis in original).
186 Id. (footnote omitted).
187 Id. at 1541 (citation and footnote omitted).
188 944 F.2d 1534 (10th Cir. 1991), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 903 (1992).




193 Id. at 1535-36 (footnote omitted).
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because an interception via extension phone is "arguably permitted
by a broad reading of the [extension phone] exemption." 194 The
court could find "no persuasive reason why Congress would exempt
a business extension and not one in the home. The difference
between listening on the extension and tapping the line within the
home in the context here is not material."1 95 Finally, the court
quoted Simpson for the proposition that the extension phone
exception showed Congress's intention to avoid "'deciding a very
intimate question of familial relations, that of the extent of privacy
family members may expect within the home vis-a-vis each oth-
er."
1 9 6
The distinction drawn between Newcomb and Heggy is quite
perplexing.197 Although Heggy made two references to Newcomb,
neither in any way explains the difference.19 8  The result in
Newcomb may very well have been different had Brent's father sued
rather than Brent: indeed, the Tenth Circuit subsequently allowed
such a suit in another case. 199 This may lead to the anomalous
result that two parties to the same illegally intercepted conversation
194 Id. at 1536.
195 Id.
196 Id. (quoting Simpson, 490 F.2d at 809). The court also referred to Professor
Schwartz's now infamous "I take it nobody wants to make it a crime" statement made
during the debates on Title III. See id. at 1536 n.5; see also supra notes 80-87 and
accompanying text.
197 See e.g., People v. Otto, 831 P.2d 1178, 1188 n.10 (Cal.) (noting the lack of a
"principled distinction" between the two cases), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 414 (1992);
Richard I. Zuber, Domestic Eavesdropping and Wiretapping Admissibility of Intercepted
Communications, 22 COLO. LAW. 455, 456 (1992) (observing that "there appear to be
philosophical differences between the Newcomb and Heggj decisions").
198 In footnote one, the Heggj court cited, without elaborating, Newcomb's
statement that the parental wiretapping situation was "qualitatively different" from
interspousal wiretapping. Heggy, 944 F.2d at 1538 n.1 (quotingNewcomb, 944 F.2d at
1535). In another footnote in the decision, the Heggy court asserted that its rejection
of Simpson's "method of statutory analysis [and] interpretation of the legislative
history" was "distinguishable from this court's previous citation to Simpson with
approval in [Newcomb]" because Newcomb cited Professor Schwartz's comment to
support Simpson. Id. at 1540 & n.7. Of course, if Simpson's analysis of the legislative
history of Title III was generally flawed, then its analysis of Professor Schwartz's
statement was probably equally flawed.
199 See Thompson v. Dulaney, 970 F.2d 744 (10th Cir. 1992). The case involved
one parent recording the conversations of her children with her separated husband
during the course of a divorce. See id. at 746. The panel, which included one of the
judges who decided Newcomb, "distinguish[ed] Newcomb as did Heggy by noting that in
Newcomb it was a minor child living at home at the time of the wiretap who was
complaining, whereas here, as in Heggy, it is the spouse who is complaining." Id. at
747 n.4. The court held that the interception could be a violation of Title III. See id.
at 748-49 (remanding to the district court for final determination).
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will have different outcomes based solely on their relationship with
the party intercepting the conversation. 2° ° A more principled
approach to the problem would have involved an analysis of whether
the ordinary course of business exception applied to the circum-
stances in Newcomb. To use the court's own terminology, there is no
persuasive reason to distinguish between the use of extension
phones in businesses and in the home.
Evidently, only one court has pursued the "ordinary course of
business" analysis in a parental wiretapping situation. In State v.
Shaw,20 1 a North Carolina court considered a case in which a
mother recorded the conversation of her son and "another young
man," Shaw, over an extension phone.20 2 The tape, which the
mother turned over to police, disclosed plans on the part of the
men to buy some "shrooms" (psychedelic mushrooms). 20 3 Based
on this evidence, the police obtained a warrant to search Shaw's
residence for controlled substances, which they found. 2° 4 Shaw
was then arrested. The court relied on Rickenbaker v.
Rickenbaker,20 5 in which the Supreme Court of North Carolina
rejected the interspousal exception to Title III, and ruled the
evidence against Shaw inadmissible. 20 6 In discussing the exten-
sion phone exception, the court stated that "[t]here was no evidence
before the trial court that the mother used a microcassette recorder
'in the ordinary course of business.'" 20 7 The court concluded
"that the activity by the mother is prohibited by Title III, which
states that any exceptions to its prohibitions are 'specifically
provided for in this chapter.'" 20 8 Although the aggrieved party in
State v. Shaw did not reside within the home (he was on the other
end of the line), the application of the court's analysis seems equally
200 As Judge Pollack noted in London v. London, 420 F. Supp. 944 (S.D.N.Y.
1976), affd, Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1977):
Having read the statute as not extending to the interception of calls by
family members within the family home, it would be anomalous to conclude
that although 18 U.S.C. § 2520 confers no cause of action in favor of the
family member it does confer a claim on the other party to the call.
Id. at 947.
201 404 S.E.2d 887 (N.C. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 407 S.E.2d 548 (1991).
202 Id. at 888.
203 See id.
204 See id.
205 226 S.E.2d 347 (N.C. 1976).
206 See Shaw, 404 S.E.2d at 889.
207 Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)(i)).
208 Id. (quoting § 2511(1)).
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applicable had the mother's son pursued the claim, unless of course
the court suddenly decided to read a parental immunity exception
into Title III. Nevertheless, State v. Shaw represents a substantial
step toward applying Title III to parental wiretapping.
Title III jurisprudence is now at a crossroads. Courts must
decide whether to continue the trend of applying Title III to
domestic wiretapping situations or to balk at the brink of prohibit-
ing private wiretaps entirely. The mandate of Title III is clear; in
essence it says "read my lips: no private wiretaps." Nevertheless,
the courts have been squeamish about their decisions in cases both
where Title III is interpreted to include an interspousal exemption
and cases where it is not.
209
What we have, to this point, is a relatively clear statute that is
broad enough to encompass parental wiretapping; an interpretation
of the exceptions to that statute which allows enough flexibility to
fit the vagaries of children's needs while maintaining a sufficient
degree of rigor; and a case history which leaves open the possibility
of further judicial action. What is still needed is ajustification and
strategy for action.
III. THE JUSTIFICATION AND STRATEGY FOR APPLYING TITLE III
TO PARENTAL WIRETAPPING
The relationship between parent and child is one which requires
particular delicacy. 210  It, even more than the relationship be-
21 See, e.g., Lizza v. Lizza, 631 F. Supp. 529 (E.D.N.Y. 1986):
The Act is a far-reaching one which, if read to cover circumstances such as
that presented by the instant case, would have serious ramifications as to the
degree of federal control over actions by family members within their own
homes. Absent a signal, either in the statute itself or in the legislative
history, that Congress intended that the Act's criminal and civil proscrip-
tions and liabilities to extend to a decision by a spouse to record conversa-
tions on his own residence's telephone, this Court must decline to impute
such an intent.
Id. at 533.
The Lizza court's concern is common to courts considering issues of familial
wiretapping. See also United States v.Jones, 542 F.2d 661, 673 (6th Cir. 1976) ("We
reach this conclusion [that interspousal wiretapping is prohibited by Title III]
reluctantly because we share the concern of other courts which have grappled with
this problem that application of federal wiretap law to essentially domestic conflicts
may lead to harsh results in individual cases.").
210 See Rodham, supra note 131, at 487 ("The[] issues of family autonomy and
privacy, state responsibility, and children's independence are complex, but they
determine how children are treated by the nation's legislatures, courts, and
administrative agencies.").
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tween husband and wife, is the basic element of society. A primary
concern of the law, then, must be to protect the proper functioning
of that relationship. In doing so, the law often dictates how some
of the most intimate social relationships are ordered. From the
moment of birth the law steps in to ensure that the child's "best
interests" are being served.211 Not everyone is comfortable with
the extensive and increasing role of the law in family life, but for
very different reasons. On one side, traditionalists argue that the
quasi-constitutional rights of parental autonomy and familial privacy
are degraded when the government intrudes on the parent-child
relationship. On the other side, children's rights advocates insist
that children can and should decide what is best for themselves.
Somewhere in between lies the justification for granting or denying
children the statutory protection of Title 111.212
It is generally accepted that a lack of privacy is detrimental to
the development of children. 213 On the other hand, it is also
accepted that state intervention in family life, though sometimes
211 See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 4
(1979):
The degree of state intervention on the private ordering of the parent-child
relationship ranges from a minimum-automatic assignment of a child by
birth certificate to his biological parents-to a maximum-court-ordered
removal of a child from his custodians because he is found to be "neglected"
or "delinquent" or they are "unfit" to be parents. The traditional goal of
such interventions is to serve "the best interests of the child."
Id.
212 It seems obvious that those who favor the children's rights viewpoint would
support the extension of Title III's protections to children. The corollary assumption
is that those who favor parental autonomy would oppose the application of Title III
to children on the theory that it would interfere with domestic relations. It should
be stressed, however, that although this section focuses on the constitutional and
quasi-constitutional bases for applying Title III, Title III itself does not rest on
constitutional principles beyond the simple application of the Commerce Clause
power to the use of telephones in interstate commerce. The "rights" conferred by
Title III can therefore be applied independently of this analysis, though the
justification for applying it may depend on a particular court's philosophical stance.
213 In summarizing research by psychologists on the effects of privacy on children,
one book noted that
access to privacy for children was generally found to be connected to self
esteem, the production of positive social behavior, and allowing the child to
separate from others in order to individuate and become more self-reliant.
All of these findings serve as examples of adaptive behavior designed to
optimize one's relationship with the home and, subsequently, with the world
outside.
1 HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 661 (Daniel Stokols & Irwin Altman
eds., 1987) (citations omitted); see also supra notes 140-47 and accompanying text.
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justified, can be detrimental to a child's development. 214 Histori-
cally, one way the law sought to protect the privacy of familial
relations was to deny causes of action by one family member against
another through the doctrines of interspousal and parental
immunity.215 The major justification for both types of immunity
is that it "promotes family harmony" by encouraging the private
settlement of familial disputes. Like the interspousal immunity
doctrine, however, which has been abrogated in a majority of
states, 216 parental immunity is generally a doctrine of the
past.217 There are at least two explanations for this. First, deny-
ing access to courts does not necessarily promote family harmony.
Indeed, in the case of wiretapping it is hard to see how family
harmony is served by allowing family members to tap each other's
phones. 218  Second, the parental immunity doctrine has fallen
214 For example, Goldstein, in the context of state decisions regarding the
placement of children, advocates a policy of "minimum state intervention" in the
home. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 130, at 4. Goldstein argues that the
complex and vital developments [during childhood] require the privacy of
family life under guardianship by parents who are autonomous. The
younger the child, the greater is his need for them. When family integrity
is broken or weakened by state intrusion, his needs are thwarted and his
belief that his parents are omniscient and all-powerful is shaken prema-
turely. The effect on the child's developmental process is invariably
detrimental.
Id. at 9. Nonetheless, Goldstein does acknowledge that state intervention is required
in some cases:
Family privacy may become a cover for exploiting the inherent inequality
between adult and child. It may prevent detection of the uncontrolled
expression of both unconscious and conscious hatred some parents have for
their children. Family privacy ceases to benefit the child and becomes a
threat to his well-being, to his safety, and occasionally to his life. Those
dangers justify state intervention.
Id. at 12-13 (footnote omitted).
215 See Rowe, supra note 21, at 863-67 (providing an historical overview of the
common law and present day interspousal immunity doctrine).
216 See Adena J. Adler, Note, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 709, 709 n.1 (1985) (listing the
jurisdictions which have partially or totally eliminated the interspousal immunity
doctrine).
217 See FOSTER, supra note 131, at 59.
218 See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text. See'also Burgess v. Burgess, 447
So. 2d 220 (Fla. 1984):
The policy of marital harmony is not furthered by permitting one covertly
to invade the privacy of his or her spouse without fear of civil reprisal. It
is undisputed that spying and prying by one spouse into the private
telephone conversations of the other does not contribute to domestic
tranquility or assist in preserving the marital estate. Eavesdropping, by
nature, undermines the faith and trust upon which the institution of
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victim to an increasing recognition of children's rights.
Over the past thirty years, the Supreme Court has effectively
eradicated the notion that children have no rights under the
Constitution.2 19 In that same period, however, the quasi-constitu-
tional rights to parental autonomy and freedom from state intrusion
into the family have been increasing.220 As Goldstein points
out,221 the Supreme Court has recognized "the integrity of [fami-
ly] life [a]s something so fundamental that it has been found to
draw to its protection the principles of more than one explicitly
granted Constitutional right."22 2 When the children's rights and
marriage is founded. A rule of law which leaves such repugnant behavior
unsanctioned can hardly be said to preserve the marital unit.
Id. at 222-23; State v.Jock, 404 A.2d 518, 520 (Del. 1979) ("To recognize interspousal
immunity in this context would reward the surreptitious spouse while according the
privacy of the targeted spouse less protection than is provided for suspected
criminals."). Though the courts in these cases were referring to the protection for
interspousal wiretapping, their analysis is no less applicable to parental wiretapping.
219 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) ("[Wlhatever may be their precise impact,
neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.");
Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,513-14 (1969) (affirming children's
right to freedom of expression); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 691-
700 (1977) (rejecting state ban on sale of contraceptives to children under 16);
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 72-75 (1976) (rejecting parental power
to veto a child's abortion).
220 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642-44 (1979) (upholding a law requiring
parental notification of a child's abortion); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 229-34
(1972) (upholding the right of Amish parents to keep their children out of public
schools); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 444-49 (1990) (upholding parental
consent requirement of an abortion statute). But see Robert A. Burt, The Constitution
of the Family, 1979 SuP. CT. REV. 329,351 ("Notwithstanding an occasional rhetorical
flourish from spokesmen for both blocs, principled legitimacy for parental authority
as such in preference to other sources of social power commands no adherents yet
among liberal or conservativejustices of this generation."). Of course, this statement
may not be applicable to the new generation ofJustices currently on the Court.
The rights to parental autonomy and familial integrity are also supported by
child psychologists. See e.g., GOLDSTEIN ETAL., supra note 130, at 9-10 (discussing the
importance of family integrity as it relates to child placement decisions by the state).
Goldstein argues that family integrity consists of three elements: parental autonomy,
a child's rights to autonomous parents, and privacy. See id. Preserving family
integrity serves two purposes:
The first is to provide parents with the opportunity to meet the developing
physical and emotional needs of their child so as to establish the familial
bonds critical to every child's healthy growth and development. The second
purpose, and the one on which the parental right must ultimately rest, is to
safeguard the continuing maintenance of these family ties-of psychological
parent-child relationships-once they have been established.
Id.
221 See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 130, at 9.
222 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551-52 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also
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parental rights clash, as in Bellotti v. Baird,22 3 which pitted the
constitutional right of minors to obtain an abortion against the
quasi-constitutional rights of parental autonomy and family
integrity, the issues become quite complex. 224 It is not clear that
it is possible or even desirable to raise the competing interests
involved in parental wiretapping to this level of constitutional
importance.
One way to avoid creating a constitutional debate over applying
Title III to children is to couch the competing interests in terms of
more traditional individual rights, rather than attempting to
constitutionalize a right to familial autonomy in the context of
wiretapping. Professor Laurence Tribe, for example, suggests that
"family integrity" is simply a catch-all phrase describing a conglom-
eration of individual rights, and that, taken together, decisions
concerning families and those concerning the individuals that make
up families cancel each other out.225 He points out that decisions
such as Wisconsin v. Yoder 226  and Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth,227 though facially at odds, "can be reconciled ... by
observing which child-rearing strategies have won the Justices'
respect," namely, only those in which "parents succeed (as the Court
found that 'the Amish succeed') in bringing obedient social
conformance from their children."228 This theory may imply that
the failure of Brent Newcomb's mother to keep her child from
trying to burn down her home229 should bar her, theoretically at
least, from exemption under Title III. A more principled way to
address the Title III situation, however, would be to argue from a
positive notion of children's rights under the statute, as suggested by
various children's advocates.
A positive formulation of children's rights can be achieved at
many different levels of generality. The most extreme, often
associated with Hillary Rodham Clinton's early writings,230 con-
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499-500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
23 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
224 See TRIBE, supra note 129, at 1590 n.8.
225 See id. at 1416; see also Burt, supra note 220, at 351 (noting the Court's failure
to lend special deference to family authority).
226 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
227 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
228 TRIBE, supra note 129, at 1417.
2 See Newcomb v. Ingle, 944 F.2d 1534, 1535 (10th Cir. 1991).
230 See generally Rodham, supra note 131 (arguing for a revision of our present
American "legal conception of children's status"and thereby give recognition to
children's needs and concerns as legal rights).
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tains three arguments:
a) the legal status of infancy, or minority, should be abolished and
the presumption of incompetency reversed; b) all procedural rights
guaranteed to adults under the Constitution should be granted to
children whenever the state or a third party moves against them,
judicially or administratively; and c) the presumption of identity
of interests between parents and their children should be rejected
whenever the child has interests demonstrably independent of
those of his parents (as determined by the consequences to both of
the action in question), and a competent child should be permitted
to assert his or her own interests.
231
Under such a broad theoretical base, Title III would clearly apply to
children. Realistically, however, the likelihood of Clinton's position
being adopted is slight. Any such change would require a literal
revolution in the law, such that even those who advocate broadening
children's rights are critical of the extreme solution of granting full
rights to children. For example, Robert Mnookin argues that
"because children lack adult capacity and maturity, giving children
the same rights and obligations as adults would often do them a
substantial disservice. They may need special protection."
23 2
More fundamentally, invoking the arguments supporting the
notion that children ought to be granted a full spectrum of rights
in order to provide protection under Title III would seem to be
overkill. What is needed is a more pedestrian justification for
judicial action which requires little revolution in the law, yet avoids
the pitfalls of full-blown state intervention in the home.233 A
231 Id. at 507.
232 ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN: ADVOCACY, LAw
REFORM, AND PUBLIC POLICY 31 (1985).
23 Though parental wiretapping may be detrimental to children, see supra note
213 and accompanying text, the harm may neither rise to the same level as harms
which normally justify state intervention, nor outweigh the harms caused by state
intervention, see supra note 214 and accompanying text. The harms of parental
wiretapping thus fall in a grey area where we would like to protect children's
interests, but fear the dangers of intervention:
The courts have traditionally respected the sanctity of the family unit,
and are quite reluctant to become involved without clear evidence of abuse,
neglect, or similar dramatic turns of events. In the vast majority of
situations, this is a very appropriate stance. Unfortunately, however, the
threshold for intervention is often set beyond the level at which psychologi-
cal problems are precipitated. That is to say, errors or decisions that are
not in the child's best interests often do not come to the attention of the
law or reach a level where legal intervention is possible, despite the fact that
psychological harm may be occurring.
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strategy proposed by Mnookin for use by children's rights reformers
may provide a middle ground which is quite appropriate for
applying Title III to children: test case litigation. As Mnookin
points out, litigation can often be more effective than legislation,
especially in an area of law as controversial as children's rights.
234
He lists three specific advantages to litigation. First, by virtue of
their role, courts are required to listen to children's rights reform-
ers. Second, courts appear to be more receptive to arguments
based on principle, especially when offered for those traditionally
deprived of legal recourse. Finally, when compared to lobbying,
litigation engenders relatively few political and ethical prob-
lems.
23 5
Test case litigation may be the best way to enforce children's
rights, 23 6 especially under a law which has been so thoroughly
debated in the courts. By announcing a more rigid prohibition on
domestic wiretapping, courts will be able to recognize the harms
being caused to children, reconcile the disparate treatment of
parental wiretapping with the purposes of Title III, and avoid a
serious invasion into the realm of familial autonomy. Although
Title III litigation initiated by children against their parents may
not, in those cases, improve familial harmony, it will, in the long
run, deter instances of parental wiretapping by generating a
recognition of children's rights under Title III among lawyers,
judges, parents, social workers, and others in a position to make a
difference.
23 7
Koocher, supra note 129, at 14. Because Title III already exists as a legislative
pronouncement against private wiretapping, if courts simply enforce the law parents
will be given fair warning that the parental wiretapping is a "breach of their child care
responsibilities." See supra note 135.
234 See MNOOKIN, supra note 232, at 521-23.
235 See id. at 522.
236 See id.
27 This phenomenon has somewhat belatedly emerged in the context of
interspousal wiretapping. See e.g., Zuber, supra note 197, at 456. Zuber's colorful
warning to practitioners of family law takes the form of poetry:
If a client with a tape likens it to Watergate,
If the lawyer is not leery of those secrets dark and dreary,
If he fails to be wary,
He may find a fate contrary, when the FBI comes knocking, knocking at his
office door.
Id. at 458; see also Jan L. Warner & C. Dixon Lee III, Federal Implications of Wiretap-
ping and Other Electronic Surveillance in Family Law Cases, 1 AM.J. FAM. L. 159 (1987)
("The family law practitioner must be on guard against the overzealous client or
opponent who utilized improper 'self help.' The family law practitioner must guard
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CONCLUSION
Title III's clear and unambiguous prohibition of nonconsensual
private wiretapping should be applied to all instances of domestic
wiretapping. The reluctance of courts to impose this restriction on
the family is unjustified not only by the legislative history and case
law, but in light of the deleterious effects wiretapping has on
familial relations. Nonetheless, even with a theoretical justification
for applying Title III to children and a strategy for doing so, public
policy and sentiment may present a barrier to the application of
Title III to parental wiretapping, 23 8 due to the perception that
enforcing the law against parents will only make matters worse.
Indeed, in an age when children can successfully sue their parents
for divorce,23 9 the last thing that is needed is another way to drive
a wedge into the family. It is my hope, in proposing a justification
for making all domestic wiretapping illegal, that it does not cause an
increase in the federal regulation of domestic relations. Rather, I
hope that the more likely result is a decrease in parental wiretap-
ping.240 Allowing a few test cases may obviate the necessity of
twenty years of debate in the courts. Perhaps in this way, we can
avoid the endless flood of cases seen in the interspousal wiretapping
dispute, which leaves in its wake a string of broken homes.
against these perils and be prepared to defend his or her client when electronic
intrusion occurs.").
238 See, e.g., ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, supra note 5, at 169-70. In discussing
courts' general reluctance to enforce Title III against domestic wiretappers, ajustice
Department attorney testified "[i]f you want to see a hostile court, ... imagine a
prosecution of a father who is eavesdropping on his 19 year-old daughter who he is
afraid has a drug habit." Id. In order to apply Title III on behalf of children, courts
will have to overcome this hostility. Considering the squeamishness which still
plagues decisions on interspousal wiretapping, see supra note 114 and accompanying
text, judicial acceptance of liability for parental wiretapping may be a long time
coming.
239 See, e.g., Kingsley v. Kingsley, Nos. 92-2430, 92-2446, 1993 Fla. App. LEXIS
8645, at *1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 1993) (upholding a suit initiated by a child
to terminate the parental status of his mother).
240 See Heggy v. Heggy, 944 F.2d 1537, 1541 (10th Cir. 1991) (expressing this
desire in the context of interspousal wiretapping).
